

THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

November 27, 1963

CONFIDENTIAL

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Venezuelan Announcement of Cuban Origin of Discovered Arms Cache

On November 3 the Venezuelan Government discovered a large arms cache buried on a beach of the Paraguana Peninsula in northwestern Venezuela. A careful examination of the weapons revealed them to be of Cuban origin. The Venezuelan Government has advised us that it plans to make the evidence public on November 28.

When we learned the Venezuelans had conclusive evidence that the arms cache was Cuban and planned to announce it, we urged President Betancourt to do two things: (1) as a minimum to present the evidence to the OAS and (2) as a highly desirable maximum to combine the disclosure with an appeal to other governments of the Caribbean area for cooperation in multilateral surveillance under Resolution II of the 8th Meeting of Foreign Ministers (Punta del Este) to detect and thwart further attempts by the Castro regime to export arms and men for subversive purposes. President Betancourt agreed to report the incident to the OAS but he was decidedly cool to the suggestion of an appeal for surveillance cooperation. His coolness is attributable to domestic political considerations, particularly the December 1 national elections and the implications of having publicly to request foreign assistance.

The Venezuelan intention to publicize the Cuban origin of the arms cache, read in conjunction with previous statements made by President Kennedy and me (compilation enclosed) about insuring that the Castro regime does not export arms and men

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

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and men in this hemisphere, makes it important that we comment promptly and publicly on the announcement. Even though the public statements which President Kennedy and I made were quite clearly referring to Cuban military action against other American Republics, they are susceptible of being interpreted as applicable to this type of incident.

A contingency press statement is enclosed. Depending on the terms of the Venezuelan announcement, it may need some adjustment, although I anticipate that the changes will be minimal. It is designed to emphasize Castro's growing interventionist activities in the hemisphere and to call for greater cooperation in watching for and thwarting these activities, without generating a sense of alarm. The statement makes clear our willingness to cooperate in surveillance but leaves the initiative to the Latin Americans from where it must come if we are to obtain their participation.

In keeping with the objective of calling attention to Cuban subversion without causing alarm, I plan to have the Department Press Officer volunteer the statement at the regular noon press briefing following the Venezuelan announcement.

Dean Rusk

Dean Rusk

Enclosures:

1. Statements by President Kennedy and Secretary Rusk

2. Contingency Press Statement

Statements by President Kennedy and Secretary Rusk Regarding Attempts by Castro to Export Arms or Men to Other Parts of the Hemisphere

PRESIDENT KENNEDY

September 4, 1962

"It continues to be the policy of the United States that the Castro Regime will not be allowed to export its aggressive purposes by force or threat of force. It will be prevented by whatever means may be necessary from taking action against any part of the Western Hemisphere.

"The United States in conjunction with other Hemisphere countries will make sure that, while increased Cuban armaments will be a heavy burden to the unhappy people of Cuba, themselves, they will be nothing more."

September 13, 1962

"But let me make this clear once again: If at any time the Communist build-up in Cuba were to endanger or interfere with our security in any way, including our base at Guantanamo, our passage to the Panama Canal, our missile and space activities at Cape Canaveral, or the lives of American citizens in this country, or if Cuba should ever attempt to export its aggressive purposes by force or the threat of force against any nation in this hemisphere, or becomes an offensive military base of significant capacity for the Soviet Union, then this country will do whatever must be done to protect its own security and that of its allies."

April 24, 1963 - News Conference

"We've made it very clear that we would not permit the movement of troops from Cuba to another country for offensive purposes."

SECRETARY RUSK

February 13, 1963 - L.A. Hollywood Palladium

"...the armed forces of the United States and its neighbors in the hemisphere will insure that arms in Cuba will not be used outside Cuba."

February 13, 1963 - Los Angeles - Biltmore Hotel

"...Cuba is not going to be permitted to be a base for aggression in this Hemisphere...."

February 13, 1963 - Speech in Los Angeles

"Cuba will not become a base for offensive military operations against other countries of this hemisphere for the simple reason that it will not be permitted to play that role."

February 26, 1963 - Houston - Texas Daily Newspaper Association

"Cuba will not be permitted to use any of its arms outside Cuba".

February 26, 1963 - Houston - Press and Radio News Briefing

"The hemisphere has made it clear that it will not accept any armed aggression out of Cuba...."

March 12, 1963 - 19th Washington Conference for the Advertising Council

"...the Armed Forces of the Hemisphere, including our own, are made available to insure that arms that are now in Cuba not be used outside of Cuba...."

Released April 13, 1963 - Interview by representatives of the General Federation of Womens Clubs in connection with Premiere Broadcast of "Women on the Move" - Filmed March 26, 1963

"...President Kennedy has made it abundantly clear...that we would not permit any arms that are in Cuba to be used outside of Cuba...."

April 18, 1963 - Transcript of remarks and answers at an afternoon session with the American Society of Newspaper Editors (ASNE) at the Statler Hilton Hotel, Washington, D. C.

"...the commitment of our Armed Forces to insure that Cuba does not pose a threat to the security of the Hemisphere."

Contingency Press Statement on Venezuela Arms Cache
(Actual Text Will Depend Upon Terms of Venezuelan Announcement)

The announcement by the Government of Venezuela that the weapons contained in the arms cache discovered on a beach of the Paraguana Peninsula on November 3 are of Cuban origin is further dramatic confirmation that the Castro regime is pursuing an active policy of indirect aggression in this hemisphere. It gives the lie to Castro's repeated protestations that Cuba exports its communist revolution only by example. The evidence conclusively demonstrates that the Castro regime is fomenting violence in other American Republics not only with subversive propaganda, funds and trained agents but also with weapons and ammunition.

The Foreign Ministers of the American Republics at their meeting in Punta del Este in January 1962 issued a clear warning that continental unity and the democratic institutions of the hemisphere were endangered by the subversive offensive of international communism. The discovery of the Cuban arms cache in Venezuela while demonstrating the growing capacity of the hemisphere to detect and frustrate Cuban subversive efforts also sounds a new alert calling for a redoubling of vigilance by the American Republics.

The Foreign Ministers also urged the governments "to take those steps that they may consider appropriate for their individual and collective self-defense and to cooperate...to strengthen

strengthen their capacity to counteract the continued intervention in this hemisphere of Sino-Soviet powers". The United States continues to take measures of its own to keep watch over the aggressive intentions and capabilities of the Castro regime and continues to assist other American governments to strengthen their internal security. The United States stands ready to work with other governments in this hemisphere in cooperative efforts to increase surveillance against and to thwart further attempts by the Castro regime to export arms and men for subversive purposes.

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MEMORANDUM

TO: The Secretary

THROUGH: S/S

FROM: ARA - Mr. Edwin M. Martin

SUBJECT: Venezuelan Announcement of Cuban Origin of Discovered Arms Cache

On November 3 the Venezuelan Government discovered a large arms cache buried on a beach in northwestern Venezuela. A careful examination of the weapons showed them to be of Cuban origin. The Venezuelans plan to make the evidence public on November 28.

We urged President Betancourt to present the evidence to the OAS. Given reports that Cuba is continuing to send arms to Venezuelan insurgents, we also urged him to combine the arms cache announcement with an appeal to other American governments in the Caribbean area for cooperation in multilateral air-sea surveillance. President Betancourt has agreed to report the matter to the OAS. He was cool to the surveillance suggestion. This reflects his concern over the domestic political implications of making such an appeal.

The Venezuelan intention to publicize the Cuban origin of the arms cache, read in conjunction with previous statements made by President Kennedy and you (TAB C) about insuring that the Castro regime does not export arms and men in this hemisphere, makes it important that we comment promptly and publicly on the announcement. Even though these public statements were quite clearly referring to Cuban military action against other American Republics, they are susceptible of being interpreted as applicable to this type of incident. A prompt, public statement by the Department will help us to deal with subsequent inquiries about what we propose to do about the disclosure.

A contingency

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

REVIEWED by [signature] DATE: 2-29-88.

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A contingency press statement is enclosed (TAB B). We do not know precisely what the Venezuelans will say in their announcement so some adjustments may be necessary. The contingency statement is designed to emphasize Castro's growing interventionist activities in the hemisphere and to call for greater cooperation in watching for and thwarting these activities, without generating a sense of alarm. It makes clear our willingness to cooperate in surveillance but leaves the initiative to the Latin Americans from where it must come if we are to obtain their participation. In keeping with our objective of calling attention to Cuban subversion without causing alarm, I think it would be best to have the Department Press Officer volunteer the statement at the regular noon briefing following the Venezuelan announcement.

Because of the importance of this matter, I recommend that you inform the President of the action we propose to take. A suggested memorandum for your signature is enclosed (TAB A).

Recommendation:

1. That you approve the text of the contingency press statement.

APPROVE_____

DISAPPROVE_____

2. That you approve the volunteering of the statement by the Department Press Officer after the Venezuelan announcement.

APPROVE_____

DISAPPROVE_____

3. That you

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3. That you sign the enclosed memorandum to the President.

APPROVE_____

DISAPPROVE_____

Concurrences:

CCA - Mr. Crimmins

ARA - Mr. Martin

P - Mr. Phillips (by phone)

C - Mr. Johnson

Enclosures:

1. Suggested memorandum to the President (TAB A)

2. Contingency Press Statement (TAB B)

3. Statements by President Kennedy and Secretary Rusk (TAB C)

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11/27/63

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

November 27, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: Cuban Arms Cache in Venezuela

1. The Venezuelans now intend to announce the discovery of the Cuban arms cache tomorrow (a postponement from Tuesday).

2. State is ginning up to issue a press ~~release~~ statement on the subject at Friday's noon briefing. In this regard, attached is an unofficial copy of a memorandum to the President informing him of the press ~~release~~ statement; also attached is a memorandum from Ed Martin to the Secretary giving some of the background. The original version has not yet been cleared by the 7th Floor but should be over here sometime tonight or tomorrow.

3. The statement strikes me as being a little too high-key. First, I am less certain than State about the need to issue a press ~~release~~ statement voluntarily; it looks a little defensive to me. Second, we might want to point out in the press ~~release~~ statement the positive aspect. The discovery of the arms cache not only demonstrates that Castro is a menace but also demonstrates the growing capacity of the Hemisphere to detect and frustrate the Cuban subversive effort -- after all, the arms were discovered. I think we should try to convey a sense of confidence in handling this sort of thing -- e.g. "Of course, this is a tough and serious problem. We are working hard on it and we will win."

I have talked to Bill Bowdler and he will try to catch the original version of the memo and inject the above point.

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Gordon Chase

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By sig NARA, Date 3-20-89

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See 2nd P. 2

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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November 28, 1963

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 88-50
By sig NARA, Date 3-20-89

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: Cuban Arms Cache -- Venezuelan Announcement

1. Attached at Tab 1 is a memorandum from the Secretary of State informing the President (a) that, on November 28, the Venezuelans intend to announce the discovery of a Cuban arms cache (they did, at about noon) and (b) that State intends to volunteer a press ~~release~~ statement on the subject at the regular noon briefing which follows the announcement (this should mean Friday but there are inconclusive rumblings that State may want to do it today). State feels that such an announcement is important in view of the fact that previous public statements by President Kennedy and the Secretary, which "were quite clearly referring to Cuban military action against other American Republics...are susceptible of being interpreted as applicable to this type of incident." (See Tab 2). Also, this announcement is consistent with our objective of calling attention to Cuban subversion without causing alarm. The press statement is attached as Tab 3.

2. John Crimmins feels very strongly that we should volunteer a press statement on the discovery of the Cuban arms cache. He regards this as a major event -- the first concrete evidence of Cuban arms being shipped to Latin America. Assuming that the press doesn't ask a question and that the event goes by without U.S. comment, inter alia, we might be viewed with suspicion by Latin Americans (e.g. "Doesn't the U.S. feel strongly about this?") and even by North Americans (e.g. "What is the Administration hiding?").

3. I, for one, am less certain than State about the need to issue a press ~~release~~ statement without being asked for it. First, a volunteered press ~~release~~ statement, the issuance of which is not even dependent upon how the press decides to play the Venezuelan announcement, strikes me as somewhat defensive. Such a State announcement, possibly read in conjunction with the recent kidnapping of an American colonel in Venezuela, would tend to blow up the U.S./Venezuela/Cuba picture more than we would like. Second, State's contention that prior statements by President Kennedy and Secretary Rusk make a volunteered announcement important, does not seem overriding. Among other things, it should be noted that Cuban subversion has sometimes been described in public as the movement of men, arms, funds, etc. between Cuba and Latin America. State seems to stretch a bit to suggest that we

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have to go out of our way to point out that the discovery of an arms cache is Cuban subversion (which we recognize and are combatting) and not Cuban aggression (which we have said we would prevent). Third, with respect to John Crimmins' point (#2 above), I don't think we have to go out of our way to prove that we are interested in preventing Cuban subversion. Who really thinks otherwise?

Experience indicates that we get the best results when we quietly pound home the message to Latin Americans bilaterally and in multilateral forms. Also, we have been in this anti-subversion business for some time and are making some progress. I personally think that the right public noise (for domestic political, as well as national security reasons) should be one of quiet confidence and determination. A volunteered statement is not entirely consistent with this approach. Neither is it entirely consistent with what our over-all public posture with respect to Cuba should be -- to keep Cuba in perspective and at as low a noise-level as possible, consistent with our national security interests.

4. Thus, my own view (and quite frankly, I appear to have little company at State) is that we should not volunteer a press ~~release~~ statement. Also, the press ~~release~~ statement, to be used on an "if asked" basis, should be further toned down (it is toned down somewhat from the unofficial version you saw yesterday).

My second choice -- if it is decided to volunteer a press ~~release~~ statement, I am in favor of a toned-down version.

5. You may want to decide this one at your 3:00 P.M. meeting with the President and the Secretary. Aside from the "whether or not to volunteer" question, we should change the press guidance now if we are going to change it. State may get some press inquiries this afternoon or tonight (there is a stop-order on now).

GC

Gordon Chase

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
BUREAU OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH

Research Memorandum
RAR-49, November 29, 1963

To : The Secretary
Through: S/S
From : INR - Thomas L. Hughes

Subject: Clandestine Arms Traffic In Latin America and the Insurgency Problem

There are recurring reports of communist arms shipments to insurgent groups in Latin America. This report assesses available information on clandestine shipments of weapons, particularly with reference to Cuban or Soviet bloc complicity in such traffic, and identifies those areas in Latin America where significant quantities of weapons are in civilian hands.

ABSTRACT

Clandestine Arms Traffic. Few Latin American governments have effective control over ownership of and traffic in arms. Nongovernmental groups or individual civilians hold large stocks of weapons in the area, notably in Central America, Colombia, Venezuala and Bolivia. The only known Soviet bloc military shipments to Latin America were made in 1954 to the communist-dominated Arbenz regime in Guatemala and to Cuba since 1960. There was no confirmation of Cuban arms reaching the rest of the hemisphere in large quantities until the discovery of an arms cache in Venezuala in early November 1963.

Insurgency Problem. Communist training of subversives, propaganda support and financing represent a greater threat to the internal security situation of most Latin American countries than arms supplied through

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By lmg, NARS, Date 9/7/76

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the efforts of Cuba or the European communist countries. The means for insurrection already are at hand in the form of arms that have been readily available to the civilian population for years.

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Areas where civilian-held arms most common

Significant quantities of weapons are in the hands of individual civilians or nongovernmental groups, particularly in Venezuela, Bolivia, Colombia and Central America. At the moment, the threat to internal security posed by these supplies of firearms is most apparent in Venezuela and Colombia. Venezuela has been undergoing a sporadic but increasing terrorist campaign by extremist forces, led since early 1962 by the Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN), which uses small arms that are readily available in the country. Political parties have traditionally maintained arsenals in case of emergency. After the fall of President Pérez Jiménez in 1958, the ruling junta attempted to forestall a counter-revolution by distributing weapons to certain segments of the population. These arms are still circulating in Venezuela, and with sufficient money a small arsenal can be accumulated. The FALN also has resorted to raids on police stations, military depots and commercial dealers in arms.

Colombia has been plagued by rural violence, bandit gangs and quasi-guerrilla groups for many years. Private groups in the rural areas long have been in possession of weapons. Most arms now held by bandit groups appear to have come from Colombian Army stocks, either by theft or occasional illicit purchases, and some were dispersed during the April 1948 riots in Bogota. A smaller quantity may have entered the country as purchased contraband. There have been variously evaluated reports of arms smuggling across the border from Venezuela, Panama, and Ecuador.

Large quantities of small arms are owned by civilians in the Central American republics. In Guatemala, for example, civilian elements have had access to substantial stocks of arms for more than a decade. It is likely that some of the 12,000 weapons of World War II manufacture supplied by Czechoslovakia to Guatemala near the end of the Arbenz regime in 1954 have fallen into private hands. Most of the remainder is believed to be in government storage or out of commission, although only a few hundred of these weapons are presently shown in Army inventory. US weapons brought into Guatemala by Castillo Armas' Liberation Army during the same year represent another source of supply which has suffered at least partial diversion to civilian groups. Small guerrilla bands operating in the Guatemalan-Honduran and Honduran-Nicaraguan border regions also have managed to secure arms by sporadic raids on government garrisons.

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Significant quantities of firearms are in the hands of the civilian populace in El Salvador; there have never been any important restrictions on ownership of weapons, and they have been widely held there for many years. In Costa Rica, several stocks of arms are under the control of groups other than regular security forces: an anticommunist, pro-government civilian security force called the Free Costa Rica Movement has a significant number of weapons, as do the antigovernment Revolutionary Civic Union and various communist groups. Weapons have circulated about the Caribbean from one country to another (including Cuba during Castro's Sierra Maestra days). Some of the arms are probably inherited from the Carribbean Legion, an irregular military force whose several hundred members sought to overthrow dictatorial regimes in the area during the late 1940's. Others have been made available by defectors from the security forces, or have been purchased through the constant trade in arms endemic to the area.

Bolivia probably has the most heavily armed population in Latin America, except for Cuba. Not only are weapons generally available for those with funds for their purchase, but organized militia groups have been in existence for more than a decade. During the 1952 revolution arms depositories were opened to supporters of the National Revolutionary Movement (MNR), and some 20,000 rifles were dispersed among the populace. Following the installation of the MNR government and the virtual liquidation of the Bolivian Army at that time, the miners and other workers were formed into militia groups with their own leaders and weapons supplies. Peasant militia groups also were organized and armed by the government. Militia groups in Bolivia, only a few thousand of whose members are under the direct control of the government, are equal to or larger than the police and the army combined in terms of manpower.

Although stocks of arms in varying quantities are held by civilians in other Latin American countries, in most cases the danger of subversive efforts resulting from the availability of weapons is not acute, either because the stocks are small or the security forces are effective. Only in the Dominican Republic has there been a noticeable increase in availability of weapons to civilians during the past year — or since the departure of the Trujillos in late 1961. In recent weeks large-scale smuggling of weapons parts from the government arms factory has reportedly placed several hundred sub-machine guns in civilian hands. Controls on the possession and import of arms in a number of countries serve to restrict supplies to some extent, at least of newer weapons. For years Brazil, where firearms, including automatic weapons, are manufactured, has

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been the locus of numerous reports on arms cached by opposition groups, both of the left and of the right; no reports of large-scale collections of arms have been confirmed, however.

Arms smuggling: Cuban and Soviet bloc involvement

Arms smuggling in several areas has gone on for years. Central America is particularly well known for this traffic. There has been small-scale gun-running between Bolivia and Peru, in both directions, for some years. Reports are received periodically concerning arms shipments in outlying, poorly-policed regions of most Latin American countries, but they are difficult to confirm, especially with respect to the origin of the shipments.

Frequently reported is complicity of the communist countries in arms traffic in Latin America. Good evidence of gun-running by sea was discovered in the Dominican Republic in 1962. The presumed recipient of the arms was an extreme leftist group, but there was nothing to prove that the weapons had come from Cuba. Transshipment of arms by Soviet ships off Belém and other Amazonian ports is recurrently rumored, and it is possible that such deliveries have been made to Brazil and other countries, but there has been no substantiation of the reports. An Italian ship allegedly transporting arms from Cuba to Venezuela in March 1963 was searched by Venezuelan police without result, at its first port of call after leaving Havana. In various instances where specific reports of weapons smuggling have been confirmed (in Guatemala, for example), only small quantities were found to be involved.

The first well-corroborated Cuban shipment of arms in quantity was made to Venezuela. On November 28, 1963, the Venezuelan Government announced that it had incontrovertible proof of Cuban arms-smuggling to Venezuelan terrorists, and subsequently requested a meeting of the Council of the Organization of American States be called under the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro dealing with threats to peace and security in the hemisphere. The arms in question--a three-ton cache discovered on the coast of Falcon State November 3, 1963--reportedly included 18 bazookas, 4 mortars, 8 57-mm. recoilless rifles, 26 submachine guns and 100 automatic rifles. The arms were of western manufacture (Belgian and US) delivered to Cuba during or prior to 1960, and some bore the Cuban shield and markings.

Significantly, there have been no reported instances of weapons of recent Soviet or Eastern European manufacture captured or discovered in the area in the hands of subversive groups. Large stocks of Czech

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military firearms still exist in Latin America, but these are almost without exception older weapons, some dating to the 1920's. Small quantities of Czech sporting arms are imported into some countries (Brazil, Venezuela, El Salvador). There have been scattered reports, some from reliable sources, of Czech embassy officials presenting modern hand weapons to certain individuals; the most accurate information on this is available from Bolivia, where Czechoslovakia is active in the trade and propaganda fields. Nevertheless, the only significant Soviet or Eastern European shipments of weapons known to have been destined for Latin America were to Guatemala in 1964 and Cuba beginning in 1960.

Arms traffic and threat to internal security

The prime threat to internal security in Latin America, as far as weapons are concerned, comes from existing stocks of arms available to the civilian populace. The threat could be increased by Soviet supplies or by shipments from Cuba's large supply of small arms, including as many as 100,000 units of Western origin acquired before or during 1960. Cuba's arsenal is a near-by potential source of weapons for dissident groups in the hemisphere, particularly if the Cuban holdings continue to be augmented and standardized with additional Soviet equipment. An increase in terrorist and guerrilla activities in most countries of Latin America would not depend on Soviet or Cuban supplies, however. Arms usually are available for those who want them badly enough, and the clandestine introduction of weapons could probably not be made in sufficient quantity to materially alter the internal security situation of most countries.

The primary impact of Cuba, and of other communist countries, on the insurgency problem in the hemisphere is in terms of subversion, training, propaganda and financing. Easily transportable funds supplied from communist sources for the purchase locally of weapons and munitions are more useful to insurgent groups than actual arms shipments with all the attendant dangers of discovery, publicity, and retaliatory action by the governments concerned.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

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November 29, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: Venezuelan Announcement of Cuban Arms Cache -- Press Handling

I spoke to John Crimmins last night regarding the press handling on the Venezuelan announcement of the Cuban arms cache.

1. I passed your message that we should not volunteer a statement and that we should reply to questions on a lower-key, backgrounder-type basis. John noted that a press release wasn't planned, but only a voluntary press statement. I made it clear that the volunteered reading of an official press statement was no more acceptable than a press release. John went on to say that the plan was to stall off any press inquiries (I would be surprised if there were many) until the press briefing on Friday. This was good to hear since I had had inklings last evening that the press people in State were not entirely clear on this point and, despite a stop-order to S/S, I was half-afraid (probably not justified) that State might spill some bad beans in view of the unsatisfactory press guidance then in hand.

2. John was not particularly pleased with our decision but said that State will revise its press guidance this morning and clear its substance and form over here. The revised guidance will take into account the details of the Venezuelan announcement (apparently the Venezuelans intend to bring the matter up to the OAS) and our interest in a lower-key approach. I assume this means that State will drop the idea of a voluntary reading of a statement. However, you may want to watch this in the event John decides to call you directly to clear the press guidance.

3. Please note Tab 3 of the attached. Assuming State's new press guidance is roughly the same as the old guidance, you may want to revise it roughly along the lines of amended Tab 3.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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November 30, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 88-50
By ~~mg~~ NARA. Date 3-20-89

SUBJECT: Miscellaneous

1. Cuban Arms Cache -- Venezuela

(a) We are fairly certain that on Tuesday the COAS will meet to receive a Venezuelan request for the application of the Rio Treaty.

(b) On the basis of conversations with the Venezuelan Ambassador, we think that the Venezuelans will ask (1) for an invocation of the Rio Treaty and (2) for the sending under the Rio Treaty of an investigating team to Venezuela to review the evidence involved in the discovery of the Cuban arms cache. We do not know what action the Venezuelans would propose once such an investigating team returned from Venezuela and submitted its report. It should be noted, however, that according to the news reports this morning, President Betancourt seems to be in a fiery mood (we don't know whether he really means it or is electioneering).

On Tuesday, the COAS will have to decide whether to apply the Rio Treaty and whether to send an investigating team, under the Rio Treaty. The COAS, before deciding to apply the Rio Treaty, might decide to send a team of its own.

(c) State is now trying to find out more information on Venezuelan intentions; the information thus far available is spotty. State is also working on its own plan of action.

2. Monday Cuban Meeting

Apparently the Secretary did not clue in the Indians in State about the Cuban meeting; therefore, as far as I can determine, State will probably have no papers. I would like to give the Indians some idea of the content of the meeting. Unless I hear differently from you, I will tell them that the meeting will consist of a general briefing of the President on what is now going on with respect to U.S./Cuban relations.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

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December 3, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: Venezuelan Arms Cache -- Application of Rio Treaty

Bill Bowdler gave me the following information about the above subject.

1. Today the COAS voted 16-0 in favor of applying the Rio Treaty and of sending an investigating team to Venezuela. Mexico abstained, Bolivia and Haiti were absent, and Venezuela did not vote. (Bill guessed that the Rio Treaty, in the past, has been applied better than a dozen times.)

2. Bill said that the members of the "soft 5" who were present performed roughly as expected. Mexico said they abstained because they doubted the applicability of the Rio Treaty to the arms cache discovery but, presumably, really abstained for the usual reasons. Brazil went along with the application of the Rio Treaty and the investigating team, but noted that Cuba should have a chance to defend itself from the charges. Chile went along but noted that this did not prejudge Chile's position on the question of further sanctions against Cuba under the Rio Treaty. Uruguay also equivocated.

3. Bill said that the performance was just about as we expected. The next step is for the investigating team to go to Venezuela and prepare its report. Once the report is made, presumably, further action will be called for under the Rio Treaty. State is now in the process of trying to decide what kind of Rio Treaty action we want to get.

GC

Gordon Chase

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S/S 18694

December 10, 1963

TO : M - Governor Harriman

THROUGH: S/S

FROM : G - U. Alexis Johnson

SUBJECT: Document for Consideration by NSC Standing Group, December 10

88-39
Doc. 14

I am enclosing a paper on possible OAS action against Cuba in connection with the Venezuelan complaint as a basis for discussion at the Standing Group at this afternoon's meeting.

Enclosure:

OAS action against Cuba.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR

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Box 25, Country File - Cuba, NSF, LBJL

88-39
14

THE SECRETARY OF STATE

WASHINGTON

December 13, 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Possible OAS Action Against Cuba

1. Possible measures to prevent Cuban arms exports to Latin America which we should seek in the OAS as a result of the Venezuelan complaint have been discussed by the Standing Group of the National Security Council.

2. Two alternatives emerged from the Group's discussion:

A. Requiring OAS authorization for the use of force in connection with visit-and-search in international waters against selected Cuban vessels and selected vessels of OAS countries:

A cooperative system of surveillance and interception involving visit-and-search in international waters on a selective basis, with force to be used if necessary. Visit-and-search and, if resistance were met, force would be applied by naval units of the United States or of cooperating OAS countries against selected Cuban vessels or selected vessels of any OAS countries which were suspected of transporting arms directly or indirectly from Cuba.

B. Not requiring OAS authorization for the use of force inasmuch as visit-and-search would take place only within territorial waters

A cooperative system of surveillance and interception involving visit-and-search only within the territorial waters of an OAS country, with force to be applied, if necessary, by that country's forces or by the forces of another OAS country acting under a bilateral agreement. The control of suspect vessels destined for a non-OAS country, (e.g. British Guiana) would depend on the cooperation of that country.

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3. Comparison of the two alternatives:

A. Alternative A would be much harder to sell to the OAS countries than Alternative B because authorization for the use of force would be required.

B. Alternative A would be somewhat more effective both in fact and as a deterrent than Alternative B, although both can be circumvented.

C. Alternative A would constitute harassment of Castro whereas Alternative B is purely defensive.

D. Alternative A would incur substantially greater risks of escalation than Alternative B.

E. Alternative A would be more expensive in terms of units required than Alternative B.

4. The attitude of Mexico and Brazil toward use of force is critical. An OAS vote authorizing the use of force in which one or the other did not join would be politically undesirable.

5. Therefore, it is necessary to ascertain the probable attitude of Mexico and Brazil. Subject to your approval, I propose to instruct our Embassies in Mexico City and Rio de Janeiro to determine discreetly and informally the probable receptivity of the two governments to an OAS resolution authorizing the use of force (draft telegram attached).

George Ball

Attachment:

Draft Telegram to
Mexico City and Rio de Janeiro
Info: Caracas.

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E.O. 12356 Sec. 3.3
NLJ 90-124
By mg NARA, Date 8-7-90

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The Department of State

Implications of Cuba's Renewed Campaign of Incitation to Violent Revolution in Latin America

During the past four months the Castro regime has progressively increased the pitch and volume of its campaign to incite violent revolution in Latin America after a period of relative quiescence. This is reflected in the output of Radio Habana as well as in statements by Fidel Castro and "Che" Guevara's article on revolutionary methods for Latin America in the September issue of Cuba Socialista.

There is good reason to believe that following his return from Moscow, and under prodding from the USSR, Castro sought a relaxation of tensions with the US in order to give him a badly needed breathing spell which would permit an all-out attempt to consolidate the regime. Castro may even have thought that he could look forward to such relaxation. Several factors seem to have contributed to this expectation: (1) our willingness to meet his terms on the ransoming of the Bay of Pigs prisoners and the spirit in which the operation was carried through; (2) our firm public stand against use of U.S. territory by Cuban exiles for hit-and-run raids against Cuba, coincidentally one of his five conditions for Cuban acceptance of inspection made at the time of the missile crisis and subsequently converted into terms for improvement of relations; (3) an illusion of Cuba's firm status within the Communist Bloc arising from attentions given him during his trip

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ARA/CCA:WGBowdler:SCA/WLG:JPMcDonnell 12/17/63 ARA - Mr. Martin

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trip to the Soviet Union; and (4) the modest lessening of East-West tensions resulting from the negotiation of the test ban treaty.

Castro's hope for a breathing spell was shattered when we instituted the Cuban Assets Control Regulations on July 9, 1963 and the President, in his July 17, 1963 press conference made very clear that we do not accept the existence and cannot coexist in a peaceful sense with Cuba as long as it remains a Soviet satellite. He correctly interpreted these developments as meaning that the U.S. had not altered its policy of strong opposition to his regime. His immediate reaction was to retaliate with an attempt to take over the U.S. Embassy building in Habana which backfired when the Swiss refused to leave unless forced to do so. In his July 26 speech, Castro resumed his sharp attacks on the U.S. and renewed the call for violent revolution in Latin America.

Realization by Castro that he could not expect any respite from the U.S. coincided with a series of other trends and developments adding to his discomfort at home and abroad:

(1) Growing economic difficulties at home leading to further belt tightening, greater regimentation and public dissatisfaction.

(2) Increasing counter-revolutionary activity demonstrated by reports of internal sabotage and exile raids.

(3) worsening of the Sino-Soviet dispute, with Soviets pushing Cuba to support their position and Castro resisting further identification with Moscow.

(4) Growing sense of political and economic isolation from the West and alienation within the Soviet bloc because of his maverick behavior.

To complicate the position of the regime further, the devastation caused by hurricane Flora virtually rules out

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any possibilities of achieving gains on the economic front in the near future. The damage will increase the economic burden to the Soviet bloc already chafing over what it must contribute to keep Castro afloat. The economic stringencies caused by Flora cannot help but produce greater unrest in Cuba over time and thereby create a more propitious atmosphere for an increase in oppositionist activities.

The dynamics of the Cuban revolutionary require it to maintain its momentum through victories at home or abroad. As Castro's domestic difficulties mount, we expect him increasingly to look for ways of scoring victories elsewhere in the hemisphere. This is why he is fanning the fires of violence in Venezuela, Colombia, Panama, Brazil, Bolivia, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Ecuador and Peru, countries where he considers conditions to be propitious. It is likely that in the months ahead he will attempt to step up his subversive activities in an effort at least to give the appearance of support for his position abroad and at most to bring about a Castro-type government in another Latin American country and thereby break out of his isolation and buttress his regime.

Another important consideration in this equation is Castro's instinct to retaliate when he considers that specific action has been taken against him. He is currently placing responsibility on the United States for increased counter-revolutionary activity in the island. The area of retaliation against U.S. assets within Cuba has been narrowed to the point where there is little left for him to seize except the Embassy and the Guantanamo Naval Base. The Swiss have blocked him on the first, and he is not likely to attempt the second because he is aware of the grave consequences for him. He must look elsewhere for targets. U.S. Government property and American private industrial and commercial establishments in Latin America are logical and likely objects to attack. To prepare for this contingency the Department considers it a matter of primary importance that the Embassies examine carefully their existing plans for dealing with this type of activity.

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Those portions of their E & E plans dealing with "stand-fast" situations should be reviewed, particularly Annex K (Internal Defense). While it is recognized that most posts have plans in the prescribed format, and have prepared Annexes K, some posts might find it necessary and/or desirable to elaborate upon that section of their plan based on the real possibility of Castro-Communist inspired terrorism as described above. In addition, posts should develop plans, to be put into effect when circumstances make such measures clearly necessary, for instituting special security measures prior to such time as the internal defense section of the E & E plan would be implemented. These might include strict visitor and package controls; around-the-clock, in office, duty officer systems (at those posts where there are no Marine Guards); local police protection; and a program of reduction and centralization of classified document holdings. So as not to cause alarm in the American community and in the local scene in general, the Embassies will want to move very cautiously in putting any of these measures into effect waiting for conditions clearly to warrant such action.

The problem of arranging effective protection for private American industrial and commercial establishments is extremely difficult because of the necessary reliance on local law enforcement and military organizations. Most posts maintain continuing liaison with local authorities especially where there are Regional Security Officers or AID public safety advisors. These contacts should be exploited to the fullest to ensure prompt action on the part of local authorities if private American installations should become the targets of terroristic activities. "Citizens Committees" (cf EE 1 216) have proven highly effective both for keeping the private American community informed of growing emergency situations (thereby affording the private citizen members the opportunity to take precautionary measures) and also of obtaining their cooperation which in some cases involves the use of resources not normally available to the U.S. Government, such as in-country communications systems, company-

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owned transportation, etc. Embassies should bear in mind in considering implementation of these measures, the same reservations contained in the previous paragraph. The Department wishes the Embassies to be forehanded in preparing to meet anticipated difficulties, but, at the same time, desires them to avoid premature action which might cause a counter-productive sense of alarm.

Finally, the Department would welcome comments from any of the addressee posts regarding additional measures which might be taken to counter the threat described in this circular.

The Embassies should instruct the Consular posts under their jurisdiction to conduct the review and necessary revision of their E & E plans as described above. The Embassies should supervise their implementation of this instruction in order to assure within-country uniformity of application.

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BOX 20, COUNTRY FILE, CUBA, NSF, LOSL

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

SECRET

January 3, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: Miscellaneous

1. Cuban Arms Cache: Bill Bowdler gave me the current status of the Cuban arms cache situation. The OAS investigating team will submit its report to the COAS/OC on January 17, at the earliest. Once the COAS/OC receives the report, it will then have to decide whether it should take Rio Treaty measures itself or call the MFM into session. In either event there will be a pause after the submission of the investigating team report so that the OAR's will have time to firm up their positions on the Rio Treaty action they want to take against Cuba.

There are preliminary indications that Brazil (1) anticipates a strong investigating team report, (2) does not favor strong Rio Treaty action, and (3) is trying to coordinate its position with Chile and Mexico. There are also reports that Brazil may want to have the issue referred to the UN Security Council, but there has been no firm move yet in this direction. We would prefer that the matter be handled in the OAS.

2. San Salvador Meeting on Anti-Subversion: The San Salvador meeting which was postponed because of the President's assassination is now going to be held on January 13. As you may recall, the purpose of the meeting is to find out how well the Managua resolutions (regarding the subversive movement of people, funds, arms and propaganda between Central America and Cuba) have been implemented and to find out where we go from here. Nick Katzenbach, who led our Managua delegation, will also head this delegation.

3. Travel Restrictions: Abba Schwartz hopes to send over a memorandum, early next week, recommending the removal of travel restrictions on all countries except Cuba. Abba says that Averell Harriman is in favor of lifting the ban, but that the Secretary may be less than enthusiastic.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 86-187
By LNG, NARA, Date 7-4-88

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Gordon Chase

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ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

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February 13, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Status Report on OAS Action on Venezuelan Arms Cache

In response to your inquiry about the status of the Venezuelan arms cache case pending before the OAS, I submit the progress report which follows.

Status of the Investigation

The OAS Investigating Committee (Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, United States, Uruguay) is nearing the completion of its work. The investigative phase is finished. The first draft of the report has been done. We anticipate that the process of review and approval will take another week to ten days.

The evidence developed on the Cuban origin of the arms is substantial and persuasive. The principal pieces of evidence are: (1) the 81 FAL rifles and 31 UZI submachine guns manufactured in Belgium for the Cuban Government in 1959; (2) the 42 bazooka rockets and 99 recoiless rifle shells shipped from the U. S. to Cuba in 1957; and (3) the Canadian-made outboard motor found at the arms cache site which has been traced from the manufacturer in Ontario to Cuba. This last piece of evidence is of major significance, particularly as it was shipped from Canada only one month before its discovery in Venezuela. It not only demonstrates the Cuban origin of the arms but also, and more importantly, it effectively meets the argument that the arms might have been planted by the U.S. or Venezuela.

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While the report will focus on the arms cache, it will also cover Cuban assistance to the Venezuelan terrorists with funds, propaganda and training. Furthermore, Cuban intervention in Venezuela will be cast within a more general framework of its general strategy of promoting subversion throughout the hemisphere.

At this juncture we are relatively certain that the findings and conclusions of the Committee will place full responsibility on the Castro regime for intervention and aggression against Venezuela. We expect this to be clearly and unequivocally stated. Up to now the Uruguayan member--the only doubtful element in the Committee's membership because his government maintains diplomatic relations with Cuba--shows every sign of accompanying the majority without reservation.

Timetable for Action

As indicated above, we expect the report will be completed in another week or ten days. Once this is done, the Council of the OAS, acting provisionally as Organ of Consultation (COAS/OC), will be convened to receive the report. The usual procedure after this is: (1) allow two or three days for the delegates to send the report to their governments and ask for instructions on the next step; (2) make the report public after this brief interval; and (3) decide whether to convene a Meeting of Foreign Ministers (MFM/OC) or have the COAS/OC act on the report. Normally in matters of this importance an MFM/OC would be held. However, in view of fact that Mexico and Chile have elections coming up, they may prefer using the less dramatic COAS/OC. In any event the effect of the decisions taken would be the same. If it is decided to hold an MFM/OC, it could probably be held early in March, probably in Washington.

Sanctions Contemplated

Our preliminary views on the measures we would like to see the MFM adopt are represented in the attached draft resolution. The draft needs further study and reworking. It is a good indication of the range of feasible measures which might be taken. The two likely to cause the greatest difficulty are the ones authorizing the use of force to prevent Cuba from exporting arms to other American Republics and calling for a break in diplomatic and consular relations.

The Venezuelans have asked us what type of action we contemplate against the Castro regime. We have shown them a copy of the resolution as indicative of our tentative thinking. We have made clear to the Venezuelans that as the aggrieved party we expect them to take the initiative in proposing sanctions and pressing for their adoption. We, of course, will back them in their efforts.

It is difficult to assess precisely the effect which the Panama crisis and the Guantanamo incident will have on OAS action against Cuba. The Panama situation continues to occupy center stage in hemisphere attention and has blurred the central issue of Communist Cuba promoting subversion throughout the hemisphere. If diplomatic relations are restored and discussions on the canal initiated before action is taken on the report, these steps should go a long way in ameliorating the adverse effects. The Guantanamo incident, as an example of Castro's impulsiveness and intemperate reaction which the U.S. handled firmly and responsibly, will probably work to our advantage, to the extent that it has any impact at all.

Publicity of Investigating Committee's Findings

At the request of the Department of State, USIA is making preparations to give wide publicity to the report of the Investigating Committee as soon as it is released. Special media materials are being developed

for distribution to all posts in Latin America. These will include a TV film, newsreel film clips, photos and special written materials, presenting the story of the Venezuelan arms cache in relation to Castro's promotion of subversion in Venezuela and elsewhere in the hemisphere, the evidence developed by the Committee on the Cuban origin of the arms, and examples of Castro-communist terrorism in Venezuela in terms of loss of human life and property damage. This propaganda effort is designed to assist the Venezuelan Government in creating a public climate conducive to the strongest possible OAS action.

Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Draft resolution

COAS/OC

RESOLVES:

1. To condemn the present government of Cuba for the acts of aggression and intervention against the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Venezuela, as well as the existence of its democratic institutions, and

In conformity with the provisions of Articles 6 and 8 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance

RECOMMENDS:

1. That the member states take all measures, individually and collectively, including the use of armed force, which they may deem necessary to ensure that no arms or implements of war of any kind proceeding directly or indirectly from Cuba reach their shores or are transported into their respective countries.

2. That, to accomplish the objectives of the preceding paragraph, the member states cooperate in establishing in the waters off their coasts and along their land boundaries systems of aerial, sea and land surveillance in order to detect any suspected movement of arms or implements of war from Cuba to any other part of the hemisphere and to use such means as they may deem necessary, including the use of armed force, /within their territorial waters or boundaries/ to search for and seize any such suspected arms or implements of war.

DECIDES:

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DECIDES:

1. To apply the following measures:

a) Rupture of diplomatic and consular relations of all the American Republics with Cuba.

b) Suspension of all trade by the American Republics with Cuba except in foodstuffs, medicines and medical supplies.

c) Suspension of all air and surface transportation between the American Republics and Cuba.

d) Closure of the ports and airports of the American Republics to ships and aircraft of other countries proceeding to or from Cuba.

2. To call upon all other states whose territories be in whole or in part within the Western Hemisphere to take measures similar to those listed in the immediately preceding paragraph.

3. To urge all the American Republics to increase their vigilance against the subversive activities of Castro-Communist elements in this hemisphere and to take all appropriate defensive measures to counteract these activities, particularly those recommendations made by the Special Committee of the Council on Resolutions II and VIII of the 8th MFM.

4. To request the cooperation of all non-hemispheric states in taking appropriate measures to carry out the purposes of this resolution.

5. To

5. To authorize OAS-SYG to transmit to the United Nations Security Council full information on the measures agreed upon in this resolution.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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February 14, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. BUNDY

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Mandatory Review
Case # 86-187
Document # 49

SUBJECT: Cuba -- Miscellaneous

1. Venezuelan Arms Cache: Attached is a memorandum from State which I asked for and which gives the status of the Venezuelan arms cache problem.

(a)(5) 2. [redacted] a-5

3. Trading with the Enemy Act: I went to a meeting at State on Wednesday to discuss the Trading with the Enemy Act. There seem to be no legal obstacles involved in applying the Act to Free World trade to Cuba; as a matter of fact, our present blocking controls are based on the Act. There will, however, be a number of sticky issues -- GATT, possible retaliation, and the apparent inconsistency of blacklisting Free World firms which trade with Cuba while not blacklisting Soviet firms which trade with Cuba. One suggestion for mitigating some of the adverse effects is to get an OAS resolution (at the time of the OAS meeting on the Venezuelan arms cache) requesting member nations to take steps to discourage Free World trade with Cuba. We could then hinge our own action on the OAS request.

The agencies are now exploring the subject in depth. Among other things, CIA is trying to determine the effect of the action on Free World trade with Cuba; Treasury is drafting proclamation language and is exploring the possible retaliatory steps which might be taken against us; State is studying Bloc/Cuba trade and Bloc/U.S. trade.

While I don't think we need heat up the agencies at this particular point, we might want to do so in about a week. I fear that if there is no real White House interest expressed, the project will drift. And, in view of the fact that our denial program is crumbling seriously, we ought to take a hard look at the Trading with the Enemy Act in the near future.

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Gordon Chase

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NLJ 86-187
By NARA, Date 4-4-88

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Mandatory Review
Case # 88-39
Document # 3

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Some Basic Issues in the Cuban Problem Requiring Policy Decisions

I am enclosing a staff paper pointing out some basic issues in the Cuban problem requiring policy decisions. It was prepared in the Department of State solely to serve as a basis for the discussion at the White House meeting this afternoon.

The paper and the detailed study which accompanies it cover the following topics:

1. OAS action on the Venezuelan arms cache.

2. Counter-measures against free-world economic ties with Cuba.

3. Measures to counter Castro-communist subversion.

I am distributing copies of the paper to other participants in the meeting.

U. Alexis Johnson

Attachment:

Memorandum.

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Modifications and Additions to Draft OAS Resolution on Venezuelan Arms Cache Case

At the meeting held at the White House on February 19, called to consider various aspects of the Cuban problem, it was agreed that revisions to the draft OAS Resolution would be prepared prior to the February 21 meeting. The revisions were to cover:

1. modification of Alternative A of paragraph 2 to make clear that the use of force on the high seas to stop and search vessels suspected of carrying arms would be applicable only to OAS country vessels, including Cuban;

2. addition of a paragraph authorizing the establishment, whether on a collective or individual basis, of a proclaimed list of firms trading with Cuba; and

3. addition of a warning to the Castro regime of the serious consequences which would follow if it continued to promote subversion in the hemisphere.

As bases for discussion working drafts covering these three points are enclosed. Tab A contains the amendment of Alternative A of paragraph 2 of the original draft resolution. Tab B contains four variants of the "proclaimed list" paragraph for the draft resolution. Tab C contains a separate draft resolution of warning to the Castro regime. Because of its complexity and importance, we have decided to cast the warning in the form of a separate resolution rather than an addition to the resolution under consideration. This arrangement can, of course, be modified.

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I am distributing copies of the drafts to the other participants in the meeting.

Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosures:

Proposed revisions to OAS Resolution
and additional Resolution

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Tab A

2a

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DRAFT OAS RESOLUTION ON
VENEZUELAN ARMS CACHE CASE

Article on Use of Force on High Seas

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(Alternative A)

2. RECOMMENDS:

(a) that the member states take all measures, individually and collectively, including the use of armed force, applicable as between themselves, which they may deem necessary to ensure that no arms, munitions, or implements of war of any kind proceeding directly or indirectly from Cuba reach their shores or are transported into their respective countries.

(b) that to accomplish the objectives of the preceding paragraph the member states cooperate in establishing

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systems of aerial, sea and land surveillance in the waters off their coasts and along their land boundaries in order to detect any suspected movement of arms, munitions or implements of war from Cuba to any other part of the hemisphere and to use such means as they may deem necessary, including the use of armed force, to search for and seize any such suspected arms, munitions, or implements of war, on the vessels or aircraft of any member state.

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DRAFT OAS RESOLUTION ON
VENEZUELAN ARMS CACHE CASE

Article Providing Base for "Proclaimed List"

VARIANT A

RECOMMENDS that the member governments in furthering the purposes of Paragraphs 3 (b) and 4 of this resolution adopt measures as may be necessary to prevent trade by persons, legal or natural, within their respective jurisdictions, with persons, legal or natural, who trade with the present Government of Cuba

Alternative 1 - in certain commodities to be agreed on by the member states.

Alternative 2 - in commodities essential to the functioning of key sectors of the Cuban economy.

Alternative 3 - which serve to consolidate the hold of the present Government of Cuba over the Cuban people and in-

crease the capability of the Cuban Government to promote subversive activities in the hemisphere.

VARIANT B

RECOMMENDS that the member governments in furthering the purposes of Paragraphs 3 (b) and 4 of this resolution adopt such measures as they may consider necessary to prevent financial and commercial transactions by persons, legal or natural, subject to their respective jurisdictions, with persons, legal or otherwise, who engage in financial and commercial activities prejudicial to the security of the hemisphere.

VARIANT C

RECOMMENDS that the member governments in furthering the purposes of Paragraphs 3 (b) and 4 of this resolution

adopt such measures as they may consider necessary to impede commercial and financial transactions which are contrary to the security of the hemisphere.

VARIANT D

RECOMMENDS that the member governments adopt such measures as they may consider necessary, within their respective jurisdictions, to further the purposes of Paragraphs 3 (b) and 4.

Tab C

DRAFT OAS RESOLUTION ON
WARNING TO CUBA

WHEREAS:

By Article 6 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance signed at Rio de Janeiro in 1947, the High Contracting Parties agreed that if the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any American State should be affected, inter alia, by an aggression which is not an armed attack, the Organ of Consultation should meet immediately to decide upon the measures which must be taken in case of such aggression to assist the victim thereof, including the use of armed force listed in Article 8 among other sanctions.

WHEREAS:

The Investigating Committee of the COAS/OC has found

that the present Government of Cuba has engaged in acts against the Government of Venezuela which constitute an aggression which is not an armed attack within the terms of Article 6 of the Rio Treaty.

THE COUNCIL, ACTING PROVISIONALLY AS ORGAN OF CONSULTATION,

(Alternative A)

RESOLVES:

1. To solemnly warn the present Government of Cuba to cease forthwith its efforts to encourage and support the overthrow of governments of other American Republics, and to manifest to the Cuban Government that the continuation of these aggressive efforts is bound to have extremely serious consequences.

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(Alternative B)

Repetition of Alternative A plus:

2. To authorize the member states, in the event that the Government of Cuba continues its aggressive actions to overthrow the governments of other American Republics, to take all measures, individually and collectively, including the use of armed force, which they may deem necessary in order to put an end to such aggressive actions.

(Alternative C)

Repetition of Alternative A plus:

DECLARES THAT:

Should the Cuban Government continue its aggressive actions the provisions of the Rio Treaty will be invoked with all promptness and the sanctions authorized fully implemented.

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[Feb. 20, 1964]

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Modifications and Additions to Draft OAS Resolution on Venezuelan Arms Cache Case

At the meeting held at the White House on February 19, called to consider various aspects of the Cuban problem, it was agreed that revisions to the draft OAS Resolution would be prepared prior to the February 21 meeting. The revisions were to cover:

1. modification of Alternative A of paragraph 2 to make clear that the use of force on the high seas to stop and search vessels suspected of carrying arms would be applicable only to OAS country vessels, including Cuban;

2. addition of a paragraph authorizing the establishment, whether on a collective or individual basis, of a proclaimed list of firms trading with Cuba; and

3. addition of a warning to the Castro regime of the serious consequences which would follow if it continued to promote subversion in the hemisphere.

As bases for discussion, working drafts covering these three points are enclosed. Tab A contains the amendment of Alternative A of paragraph 2 of the original draft resolution. Tab B contains four variants of the "proclaimed list" paragraph for the draft resolution. Tab C contains a separate draft resolution of warning to the Castro regime. Because of its complexity and importance, we have decided to cast the warning in the form of a separate resolution rather than an addition to the resolution under consideration. This arrangement can, of course, be modified.

I am

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I am distributing copies of the drafts to the other participants in the meeting.

Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosures:

Proposed revisions to OAS Resolution
and additional Resolution

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44b

Tab A

DRAFT OAS RESOLUTION ON VENEZUELAN ARMS CACHE CASE

Article on Use of Force on High Seas

88-42
44b
R

(Alternative A)

2. RECOMMENDS:

(a) that the member states take all measures, individually and collectively, including the use of armed force, applicable as between themselves, which they may deem necessary to ensure that no arms, munitions, or implements of war of any kind proceeding directly or indirectly from Cuba reach their shores or are transported into their respective countries.

(b) that to accomplish the objectives of the preceding paragraph the member states cooperate in establishing

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systems of aerial, sea and land surveillance in the waters off their coasts and along their land boundaries in order to detect any suspected movement of arms, munitions or implements of war from Cuba to any other part of the hemisphere and to use such means as they may deem necessary, including the use of armed force, to search for and seize any such suspected arms, munitions, or implements of war, on the vessels or aircraft of any member state.

Tab B

44c
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DRAFT OAS RESOLUTION ON VENEZUELAN ARMS CACHE CASE

Article Providing Base for "Proclaimed List"

88-42
44c

VARIANT A

RECOMMENDS that the member governments in furthering the purposes of Paragraphs 3 (b) and 4 of this resolution adopt measures as may be necessary to prevent trade by persons, legal or natural, within their respective jurisdictions, with persons, legal or natural, who trade with the present Government of Cuba

Alternative 1 - in certain commodities to be agreed on by the member states.

Alternative 2 - in commodities essential to the functioning of key sectors of the Cuban economy.

Alternative 3 - which serve to consolidate the hold of the present Government of Cuba over the Cuban people and in-

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crease the capability of the Cuban Government to promote subversive activities in the hemisphere.

VARIANT B

RECOMMENDS that the member governments in furthering the purposes of Paragraphs 3 (b) and 4 of this resolution adopt such measures as they may consider necessary to prevent financial and commercial transactions by persons, legal or natural, subject to their respective jurisdictions, with persons, legal or otherwise, who engage in financial and commercial activities prejudicial to the security of the hemisphere.

VARIANT C

RECOMMENDS that the member governments in furthering the purposes of Paragraphs 3 (b) and 4 of this resolution

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adopt such measures as they may consider necessary to impede commercial and financial transactions which are contrary to the security of the hemisphere.

VARIANT D

RECOMMENDS that the member governments adopt such measures as they may consider necessary, within their respective jurisdictions, to further the purposes of Paragraphs 3 (b) and 4.

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44-d
R

Tab C

DRAFT OAS RESOLUTION ON WARNING TO CUBA

88-42
44d

WHEREAS:

By Article 6 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance signed at Rio de Janeiro in 1947, the High Contracting Parties agreed that if the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any American State should be affected, inter alia, by an aggression which is not an armed attack, the Organ of Consultation should meet immediately to decide upon the measures which must be taken in case of such aggression to assist the victim thereof, including the use of armed force listed in Article 8 among other sanctions.

WHEREAS:

The Investigating Committee of the COAS/OC has found

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that the present Government of Cuba has engaged in acts against the Government of Venezuela which constitute an aggression which is not an armed attack within the terms of Article 6 of the Rio Treaty.

THE COUNCIL, ACTING PROVISIONALLY AS ORGAN OF CONSULTATION,

(Alternative A)

RESOLVES:

1. To solemnly warn the present Government of Cuba to cease forthwith its efforts to encourage and support the overthrow of governments of other American Republics and to manifest to the Cuban Government that the continuation of these aggressive efforts is bound to have extremely serious consequences

(Alternative B)

Repetition of Alternative A plus:

2. ~~To authorize~~ would require the member states, in the event that the Government of Cuba continues its aggressive actions to overthrow the governments of other American Republics, to take all measures, individually and collectively, including the use of armed force, which they may deem necessary in order to put an end to such aggressive actions/ and threats etc

(Alternative C)

Repetition of Alternative A plus:

DECLARES THAT:

Should the Cuban Government continue its aggressive actions the provisions of the Rio Treaty will be invoked with all promptness and the sanctions authorized fully implemented.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Counselor and Chairman
Policy Planning Council
Washington

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February 21, 1964

68-42
54

TO: Mr. McGeorge Bundy

FROM: W. W. Rostow

SUBJECT: Our Conversation on Arms Cache Policy.

1. Whatever the wisdom or unwisdom, legality or illegality of what we have been doing against Cuba, the legality of the action I propose is based on two solid facts in the Hemisphere:

a. The OAS declared (in Resolution I of Punta del Este) that "the continental unity and the democratic institutions of the hemisphere are now in danger. .... The principles of communism are incompatible with the principles of the inter-American system."

b. The Cubans conducted aggression against Venezuela, as formally defined by the OAS.

The first fact gives us within the Hemisphere somewhat more license to act against Cuba than we might have elsewhere in the world; but nothing that we may have done to Cuba justifies Venezuela's having to submit itself passively to Cuban aggression.

2. As for the fact that we might have to conduct acts of limited violence every three months, maybe that is precisely what we have to learn to do if the Communist shipment of arms and men across frontiers is going to stop. The Communists conduct acts of violence against us every day: in Venezuela, Peru, Ecuador, for example. So far as they are concerned, they are in contact with their enemy. In a military sense, they are engaged. One of our major weaknesses

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is that we draw so sharp a distinction between war and peace, filling the gap only with covert operations. It is precisely this vulnerability which makes it so attractive for the Communists to persist in this game, after virtually all other forms of Communist aggression against the Free World have been rendered ineffective or sterile. Here we are, the greatest power on the world scene, presenting ourselves as an impotent giant in Southeast Asia and the Caribbean, in the face of low grade aggression. And this low grade aggression can yield major shifts in the balance of power. I suspect we have to learn to use overt force more often -- under strict control -- if possible with others -- when we have established -- with law and evidence -- that aggression has taken place. If we do this act of policing once or twice, the odds are good that a thoroughly frightened international community will move collectively to stop indirect aggression of this kind, and the Communists will accept the new rules of the game. After all, there has been no repetition of the kind of aggression which triggered the Korean war.

3. It remains to be seen, of course, but I would doubt that Castro, Hemispheric opinion, American public opinion, or the rest of the world -- let alone Republican campaigners -- are going to be much impressed with a policy of deterrence by resolution. We negotiated two quite solid resolutions at Punta del Este. The question is whether we back our play.

53a

THE WHITE HOUSE

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 98-41
By [illegible] NARA, Date 3-2-99

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February 22, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Cuba Meeting - Wednesday, February 19, 1964

PARTICIPANTS: The Attorney General; General Taylor; Director McCone; Ambassador Bunker; Deputy Secretary Vance; Under Secretary Fowler; Deputy Under Secretary Johnson; Assistant Secretary Mann; Assistant Secretary Behrman; Acting Director Wilson; Special Assistant Califano; Desmond Fitzgerald; John Crimmins; McGeorge Bundy; Ralph Dungan; Gordon Chase

The group discussed the problem of OAS action resulting from the Cuban arms cache discovery. (State's staff paper of February 19 is attached.)

1. Timing and Form - The OAS investigating team is expected to submit its report to the C/OAS on about February 24. Mr. Mann said that while the Venezuelans are anxious to get an MFM under way as soon as possible, we want to slow up the pace. Among other things, we want to give the public some time to digest the OAS report; also, we can use the time to work the corridors and have as many OAR's as possible on our wave-length by the time of the meeting. Mr. Mann added that the odds are presently better than even that we will get involved with either an extended or a brief MFM.

2. Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine - Mr. Mann, noting that Castro is probably going to be with us for some time, said that we ought to think seriously about doing something fairly drastic to prevent further Cuban subversion. He suggested that we add a paragraph to our draft OAS resolution which will warn Castro that if he continues with his subversion, we will retaliate with force under the Rio Treaty. Such a paragraph will do two things: First, it will make clear to the Russians and Cubans that we regard subversion as "armed aggression." Given time to digest this message the Russians may be encouraged to control Castro. Second, it will provide a juridical umbrella for any future forceful retaliation we have to take. The group went on to discuss the Mann proposal at some length.

(a) General Taylor wondered whether this doctrine could have world-wide application.

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(b) The Attorney General, in the first instance, expressed doubt on several scores. First, how do you define subversion? Second, subversion is hard to prove even when, on rare occasion, we have the evidence; for every witness we could find to support a charge of subversion, Castro would come up with four who would say there was no subversion. Third, retaliation by force is no simple matter; our decision-making experience of October, 1962 made this clear. Finally, time-lag is a problem; the arms cache occurs and three months later, after the research is completed, we retaliate - this is somewhat unrealistic. Alexis Johnson wondered how we know if a particular act of subversion is Castro-inspired.

(c) Mr. Bundy said that, generally speaking, the Mann proposal has merit and noted that it represents a thickening and variation of the "Kennedy Doctrine", expressed in President Kennedy's Miami speech of November 18. He added, however, that we should be careful about how much we thicken the Doctrine in the context of the arms cache discovery; our response must be appropriate to the crime. Generally speaking, we should keep the language of the resolution general and flexible and not tie ourselves down to a particular course of action in the event of further Castro subversion. But even general and flexible language will be useful; it will probably serve as a deterrent of sorts and will tend to put the President in a stronger position if and when we do have to resort to forceful action. Mr. Bundy added that we should continue to explore and study the "eye for an eye" doctrine.

(d) The group agreed that we should try to get "warning-type" language into the OAS resolution. If we succeed, it will strengthen our juridical position; if we fail, we lose little and may even gain politically. The group further agreed that the language should be cognate to a possible Presidential statement on the same subject to the U.S. public and to a stern, private warning to the Russians that Cuban subversion could lead to a very dangerous situation. In the latter regard, Mr. Bundy thought that, if we do the job right, the Russians may well take us seriously.

(e) The Attorney General said that we had to concern ourselves not only with preventing the export of subversion from Cuba but also with the problem of responding in the event "another Cuba" occurs in Latin America. Mr. Bundy said that a study last spring indicated that it was extremely difficult to plan for this sort of eventuality which can come in innumerable shapes and sizes, not all of which clearly call for a U.S. response. At the request of the group, he agreed to distribute copies of the study. Mr. Bundy added that it might also be worthwhile to study our capabilities to respond (e.g. a "snuff-out" force).

3. Surveillance Involving Force - The group generally did not favor an OAS resolution which calls for a surveillance system involving the stopping and searching of selected vessels on the high seas (the "force" option). The measure would

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not be very effective and would probably give us as much trouble as it would give Castro. On the other hand, a resolution which calls for a surveillance system involving the stopping and searching of vessels in territorial waters (the "non-force" option) appears to be the appropriate response to the arms cache issue. Also, with such language as an umbrella, we can work out measures whereby U.S. forces can assist other OAR's in their territorial waters.

General Taylor dissented: he favored the "force" option. It would act as a deterrent to the Cubans and would give us a reprisal capability.

4. Cuban Reaction - The group agreed that, in response to OAS charges, the Cubans will take the public line that the OAS ought to investigate U.S. overt and covert aggressions against Cuba. The Cubans have already started peddling this line.

5. Proclaimed List - The group agreed that we should consider laying a basis in the OAS for possible proclaimed list action. Mr. Bundy noted that it would be nice if other OAR's took proclaimed list action also. It would not only make the measure more effective in impeding Free World commercial ties with Cuba, but would also demonstrate to the Free World that the U.S. is not alone in its concern over Cuba. Mr. Fowler added that the proclaimed list action should be prospective and should not include the freezing of assets.

One stumbling block to a proclaimed list is the Soviet Bloc dimension - i.e. can we blacklist Free World firms which trade with Cuba while not blacklisting Soviet Bloc organizations which trade with Cuba? Mr. Johnson and Mr. Behrman felt that this appeared to be an impossible hurdle. Messrs. Bundy, Mann, and Fowler felt that the apparent inconsistency was bearable; in this regard, Mr. Fowler noted that we expect more from our friends than our enemies.

6. Salability of a Tough OAS Resolution - Mr. Mann felt that with careful planning and great determination, we may well be able to get a tough resolution out of the OAS. The group then discussed the consequences of getting beaten in the OAS; Mr. Bundy noted that going in tough and getting licked may not be so unbearable from certain points of view.

Mr. Bundy pointed out that we should be under no illusions about the coming OAS action. As tough as our resolution may be, the chances are very good that we will still be living with Castro some time from now and that we might just as well get used to the idea. At the same time, we should probably continue our present nasty course; among other things, it makes life a little tougher for Castro and raises slightly the poor odds that he will come apart and be overthrown.

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7. Venezuelan Leadership and Noise-Level - The group agreed that while the Venezuelans should publicly lead the fight, we will have to give them plenty of support. In this regard, USIA is geared up to do an intensive selling job in Latin America if it is deemed desirable; the U.S. Government will have to determine the size and shape of the noise-level to be produced during the period which follows the submission of the OAS report.

GC

Gordon Chase

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NLJ 88-4
By NARA, Date 2-12-90

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2/24/64

OAS Action on Venezuelan Arms Cache - U.S. Objectives and Expectations

The following is a discussion of the action against Cuba we want the OAS to take as a result of the discovery of the Cuban arms cache in Venezuela. It is also a discussion of the results we expect to achieve by getting the OAS to take such action.

1. U.S. Cuban Policy in General - The bare minimum objective of our Cuba policy is a Cuba which poses no threat to its neighbors and which is not a Soviet satellite. In moving towards this objective we have rejected the options of unprovoked U.S. military intervention in Cuba and of an effective, total blockade around Cuba - primarily because they would risk another US/USSR confrontation. Instead, we are engaged in a variety of unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral actions and pressures, both offensive (e.g. economic denial and covert programs) and defensive (e.g. counter-subversion program) which stop short of invasion or blockade.

It is not at all clear that these measures short of military intervention/blockade will lead to our minimum objective. About the most that can be said is that we appear to be moving in the right direction. A tough, nasty, but no invasion/blockade policy, as opposed to a softer policy, is most likely to protect the Hemisphere from Castro's aggressive intentions and probably lays the best groundwork for bringing about any of the eventualities which would constitute a removal of the Soviet satellite from the Hemisphere - such as an overthrow of the Castro regime or a Soviet decision to quit Cuba. From a domestic political viewpoint, a tough but no invasion/blockade policy, fortuitously, is one policy which the American people appear prepared to support at this time.

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2. The Opportunity Afforded by the Arms Cache Discovery - While the discovery, four months ago, of three tons of Cuban arms is not considered to be sufficiently provocative to lead us to risk a US/USSR confrontation and to take decisive action against Cuba via military intervention/blockade, the discovery of the arms cache does provide us with an excellent opportunity to make further progress in tightening up and extending our present policy towards Cuba. In working towards this end we must be careful to move in those areas where we want to move, and not necessarily in those areas where false logic would appear to dictate that we move. For example, since the crime is a matter of arms, it does not necessarily follow that we must do something flashy and expensive (politically and financially) about arms, especially since our best estimate is that the likelihood of further significant arms shipments from Cuba is small.

In taking advantage of the arms cache discovery and the concommitant OAS attention, there are two areas in which we can profitably move with energy- in the shoring up and extension of our isolation policy and in the strengthening of our anti-subversion program.

3. Further OAS Action to Isolate Cuba - Appropriate OAS action on the arms cache issue can take us a long way in our effort to shore up and extend our present isolation policy. Specifically, the following is what we want:

(a) We want the OAS resolution, in flexible and general language, to provide a basis for possible unilateral U.S. action to reduce Cuban/Free World commercial relations (e.g. the drastic measure of a proclaimed list); more importantly, we want the resolution to encourage as many OAR's as possible to join us in our effort. At present, one of the major obstacles to our efforts in

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the field of economic denial is the non-OAS Free World argument that the U.S. is the only country in the Western Hemisphere which is really concerned about Cuba. To counter this argument, we must demonstrate clearly that the Hemisphere regards Cuba as a threat, that the Hemisphere supports the isolation policy, that the Hemisphere looks with disfavor upon traders who do business with Castro, and that the Hemisphere intends to take appropriate action against such traders.

If we fail in this effort to get OAS support, we will probably be faced with a continuation of the serious deterioration which has already begun with respect to our economic denial program. On the other hand, if we succeed in our effort, the chances are considerably enhanced that we will be able to break the growing Cuban/Free World commercial ties. Assuming we can get appropriate OAS language and follow up, it is conceivable that the U.S., Colombia, Venezuela, Nicaragua, Guatemala, Honduras, Salvador, Paraguay, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, and Ecquador will all take some kind of action (not necessarily the same in each country) which will make it clear to Free World traders that they can't have it both ways and that they must choose between Cuba, with a population of 6,000,000, and selected OAS countries whose populations total about 230,000,000. In selling this proposal to the OAR's we will point out, inter alia, that they will not be forced to sacrifice much in real terms since there will be relatively few Free World traders who will ultimately choose the Cuban market in such circumstances. Indeed, only Cuba will be seriously hurt.

Assuming the OAS passes a resolution which meets this problem, we will be in a position to follow it up immediately by proposing to willing OAR's that

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they meet with us to devise means of implementing the OAS decision - e.g. the circulation of lists of Free World Cuban traders among OAS countries.

(b) We want the OAS resolution to encourage further steps within the Hemisphere to isolate Cuba. First, we want the remaining five OAS countries which maintain diplomatic and consular relations with Cuba to sever such relations. Such a step will be dramatic evidence of Cuba's isolation and to some extent will hinder Cuba's suversive operations by denying Cuba the use of its overseas missions for this purpose. Importantly, it will be a clear sign to other Free World countries that the Hemisphere, expressing itself through the OAS, feels strongly about Cuba. It will also be a heavy psychological blow to Castro who has tried persistently and energetically in the past several months to establish "normal" relations with many Free World countries. Second, we want the suspension of all trade (except food and medicines) between Cuba and the OAR's. While trade between Cuba and the OAR's is small, such action will again demonstrate Cuba's isolation and OAS solidarity on the matter of Free World trade with Cuba. Third, we want a general call to Free World countries to cooperate with us in our effort.

4. Further OAS Action to Counter Castro/Communist Subversion - Appropriate OAS action on the arms cache issue can also take us a long way in our effort to strengthen our counter-subversion program. Specifically, the following is what we want:

(a) We want the OAS resolution, in flexible and general language, to warn Castro that the OAS will not stand by idly if he continues his subversive efforts. This resolution will be cognate with a possible Presidential statement along

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similar lines to the U.S. public and a stern, private warning to the Russians that Cuban subversion is leading to a highly dangerous situation. Hopefully, such a resolution will have two main results. First, it will deter Castro from further subversive actions; among other things, the Russians may find it in their interest to control Castro more closely. Second, it will provide a juridical umbrella for and pre-position the OAS and/or the U.S. to use force against Cuba in the future if it is deemed desirable to do so.

(b) We want the OAS resolution to call for the establishment of a surveillance system which will permit the stopping and searching in territorial waters of all vessels suspected of carrying arms and subversives; a similar air surveillance system will also be established. While there are some negative aspects to such a resolution (few, if any, arms will be found), there are good reasons for having it. First, since an arms cache is involved, we must, at a minimum make a bow towards the problem of controlling arms shipments. Also, the resolution will be viewed as a tightening measure, and the fact that no further arms shipments occur can be interpreted as a result of the establishment of a surveillance system. Second, it will possibly deter Castro somewhat from sending men and arms to Latin America. Third, it will provide a peg on which to hang closer and more effective bilateral cooperation which may be called for in the future. For example, the U.S. and Venezuela may want to work out an arrangement whereby U.S. vessels can enter Venezuelan waters to assist in the seizure of a suspect vessel. Fourth, while it will give us an instrument to harass Castro marginally, it has no significant escalation implications.

(c) We want the OAS resolution to call for the suspension of all air and sea communications between Cuba and OAS countries - ie. that ships and

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aircraft of OAS countries will not go to Cuba, that Cuban aircraft and ships will not be permitted in OAS country ports or airfields and that ships and aircraft of non-OAS countries will not be allowed to stop at an OAS country port or airfield if proceeding enroute to or from Cuba. This action will have some most desirable effects. It will considerably increase Cuba's difficulties in exporting subversives, especially if the Cuba/Mexico air-link is cut. In addition, it will probably be effective in reducing even further the number of Free World ships which still call at Cuban ports.

(d) We want the OAS resolution to encourage further steps within the Hemisphere to counter Castro/Communist subversion. We want a condemnation of the Castro regime for its aggressive acts against Venezuela. Also, we want a renewed call for alert against Castro/Communist subversion and an endorsement of the Lavalle Committee recommendations outlining specific measures on control of travel, funds, and propaganda for subversive purposes.

5. Priority Listing of U.S. Objectives - The following is a summary listing of the major actions we want. They are listed in order of their importance in furthering the objectives of present U.S. policy towards Cuba.

(a) OAS words and action to stop the rapid deterioration in our economic denial program.

(b) Warning to Castro regarding future subversive action, with the threat of meaningful retaliation.

(c) Breaking of air and sea communications with Cuba.

(d) Breaking of diplomatic and consular relations.

(e) Establishment of a surveillance system.

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It should be noted that the actions most important to us may not be the most difficult to get. For example, the economic sanctions may not be as difficult to get as the breaking of diplomatic relations.

6. Tactics - It is impossible to predict how many of the above mentioned actions we will get until we have an opportunity to publicize the arms cache issue and to reconnoiter the OAS landscape. Our general objective is to obtain as much of the total package as possible. To this end, our tactics will include the following elements.

(a) To the extent possible, we will keep Venezuela in the lead. We will be close behind the Venezuelans, however, supporting them with great determination and energy.

(b) A high noise-level will be needed in Latin America to obtain our objective. To this end, the USIA will proceed with a large scale effort to publicize the investigating committee's report.

(c) A fairly high noise-level will be desirable in non-OAS Free World countries to gain their acceptance of OAS decisions, particularly in the economic field. The general theme we will convey is that a confident but outraged Hemisphere is banding together to take further measures against Cuba. We have been telling the truth all along about the Cuban threat to Latin America and the arms cache discovery proves it. As appropriate, we will distribute the USIS film to non-OAS Free World countries.

(d) Domestically, the arms cache issue will be played in low-key. The general theme will be that the U.S. is not directly threatened and the real Cuban threat is subversion directed against Latin America. While we intend to aid the

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Hemisphere as much as possible in the fight against Cuban subversion, the control of subversives is and must necessarily be primarily the responsibility of the target countries.

A low-key posture in the U.S. will be very difficult to maintain if an MFM is scheduled in Washington. Therefore, if an MFM is to be held, we will consider carefully whether or not it should be held elsewhere.

7. Practical Results - Assuming we are entirely successful in obtaining all the OAS action we want, we must be clear as to what the practical results will be, and what they will not be.

(a) There will not be an immediate overthrow of the Castro regime and an immediate and complete cessation of Castro/Communist subversion in Latin America.

(b) There will be a juridical umbrella for the use of force against Cuba in the future, if deemed desirable.

(c) There will be, at a minimum, a delay in an upswing of the Cuban economy.

(d) There will be an increased burden placed on the Soviets to support the Cuban economy.

(e) There will be a further political isolation of Castro. Psychologically, this will wound Castro deeply.

(f) There will be a substantial impediment put in the way of Castro/Communist subversive activities in Latin America.

Gordon Chase

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By [redacted] NARA Date 2/13/97

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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February 27, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Cuba Meeting - Friday, February 21, 1964

PARTICIPANTS: The Attorney General; General Taylor; Ambassador Bunker; Ambassador Stewart; Deputy Secretary Vance; Deputy Under Secretary Johnson; Special Assistant Califano; Acting Director Wilson; Ward Allen; John Crimmins; Desmond Fitzgerald; McGeorge Bundy; Gordon Chase

The group met to follow up their discussion of February 19 regarding OAS action resulting from the Venezuelan arms cache discovery. (Attached is a copy of the discussion paper.)

1. The Venezuelan Position - After a status report by Mr. Allen, the group discussed the Venezuelan position.

(a) (3) (5) Ambassador Stewart said that the Venezuelans are prepared to take very strong Rio Treaty action, [redacted] they are especially anxious to quarantine Cuba's export of subversion. He went on to admit, however, that the capability of the Venezuelan Foreign Office to sell a tough OAS resolution to other Latin American countries is not great. We will have to do a major share of the selling.

(b) Ambassador Stewart said that the Venezuelans might agree to a surveillance system whereby U.S. ships could shadow suspect vessels into Venezuelan waters. He had some doubts as to whether or not the Venezuelans would allow us to seize a suspect vessel in territorial waters; they might, if it were clear that Venezuelan forces could not arrive at the scene in time to make the seizure themselves.

2. Surveillance System - With the exception of General Taylor, the group favored the "non-force" option. Mr. Vance favored the "non-force" option because it is a more flexible system. Mr. Fitzgerald noted that the arms shipment to Venezuela was a deviation from Castro's normal mode of procedure; he is unlikely to ship arms in the future. General Taylor commented that we should be clear that neither the "force" nor the "non-force" surveillance system will be very effective. He likes the "force" option because it gives us a reprisal capability.

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The group agreed that the OAS resolution should include language which will allow us to search suspect vessels and aircraft for subversives as well as for arms.

3. Economic Sanctions and Warning to Castro - The group agreed that the OAS language should be as general as possible in encouraging OAS countries to take action against Free World traders who deal with Cuba. General language is more likely to get OAS approval. The group agreed that, in warning Cuba that it had better not continue its subversion, the OAS language should also be general and flexible.

4. Noise-Level - The group agreed that a high noise-level in Latin America will be needed to obtain a tough OAS resolution. At the same time, it is desirable to keep the noise-level low in the U.S.

The general shape of the noise-level we want to get across is that Cuba is not solely a U.S. problem, but is a genuine Hemispheric problem. A confident but outraged Hemisphere is banding together to take further measures against Castro. The arms cache incident is a grave demonstration of what we have been saying for some time.

5. Action Items - The group agreed that a series of actions should be taken:

(a) The State Department should write a fresh draft of the OAS resolution and send it to Palm Beach to the Secretary so that the Secretary might get the President's approval in principle.

(b) State should explore the problem of how the OAS meeting ties in with the Alliance for Progress meeting in March. This situation must be handled carefully.

(c) Mr. Chase should write a paper by February 24 which discusses the action against Cuba we want the OAS to take, and the results we expect to achieve by getting the OAS to take such action. Mr. Chase should clear his paper with Mr. Crimmins.

6. USIS Film - The group watched a USIS film about the arms cache, which will be shown on TV in Latin America. The general consensus was that it is a very convincing piece of work.

GC

Gordon Chase

45

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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March 4, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: OAS Resolution

1. I refer to your interest in beefing up the language of the OAS resolution with respect to possible further economic sanctions against Cuba. Attached is a State paper which lists four variants of language. As it stands, we are using Variant D. I, for one, would be in favor of trying to sell Variant B or C to the OAS. They are more specific but still do not tie us on to a proclaimed list.

2. ARA is in the process of writing a covering memo for the OAS resolution agenda item. (The OAS resolution itself is apparently very little changed from the version which was drafted ten days ago.) It is supposed to be over here this afternoon.

GC

Gordon Chase

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 88-47
By ... NARA, Date 5-12-90

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

file Cuba

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March 4, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. DUNGAN

SUBJECT: OAS Action on Venezuelan Arms Cache

I refer to your request for documents which pertain to the up-coming action in the OAS. Attached are two documents.

1. A paper which was used as the basis for discussion at a meeting on February 21. I don't think you will find it terribly useful.

2. A somewhat dated (February 24) draft of mine which is a discussion of (a)the action we want the OAS to take as a result of the discovery of the arms cache and (b) the results we expect to achieve by getting the OAS to take such action. The paper has no status as yet and has been seen only by Mr. Bundy and John Crimmins. Nevertheless, you may find it useful.

GC
Gordon Chase

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 98-47
By ... NARA. Date 6-12-98

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Box 25, Country File - Cuba, NSF, LBJL

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March 5, 1964

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 99-44
By [illegible] NARA, Date 3-23-99

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: NSC Meeting - OAS Resolution

While there is little to say which has not already been thoroughly thrashed out, I might add these comments:

Article 2 -- There may be a tendency by Tom Mann and others to make the warning article the focal point of the whole resolution, and perhaps of our whole Cuba policy. I don't think it should be, especially in view of the fact that no one can say what we will actually do if Castro continues varying levels of subversion. Also, the warning article, per se, takes us no closer to one of the real cruxes of the Cuban problem - breaking the Cuba/Bloc tie line (by overthrow; by Soviet decision to quit Cuba; or by accommodation on U.S. terms). In short, we should not sacrifice the rest of the OAS package on the altar of Article 2. I, for one, would be ecstatic with an OAS resolution which contained only a weak Article 2 but which contained everything else we want.

Article 4(b) and Lard -- The group may wish to look closely at the lard problem vis a vis this article which calls for the suspension of all trade of the American Republics with Cuba, except for foodstuffs, medicines, and medical supplies. If we are heading in the direction of cutting off lard shipments to Cuba, we might want to consider whether or not we can get cover from the OAS - i.e. a resolution which calls for the suspension of all trade between the OAR's and Cuba.

My own view is that we couldn't get such a resolution even if we wanted it. In addition, it does not make sense to expend political capital in order to get it when there are other items in the resolution we want much more.

Article 6 -- This is the article which acts as the hook on which to hang further economic sanctions against Free World firms trading with Cuba. There might be merit in making it stronger, especially if the NSC meeting produces some feeling that we are willing to move in the direction of a blacklist. (Some stronger language is at Tab 3 (at the paper clip) of your folder.) My own feeling at this point, however, is that the follow-through is much more important than the language.

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I think I have found some support on the blacklist question. Brad Patterson, Secretary Dillon's Assistant, tells me that, at least a week ago, Treasury looked fairly favorably on a blacklist operation. With an OAS cover and no freezing of Free World assets in the U.S., the risks of retaliation would be manageable.

If there is a general discussion of the blacklist, I hope that everyone becomes clearly aware of the concrete dimension of the problem -- e.g. Free World exports to Cuba of $115 million; no one concretely gets hurt but Cuba; the alternative we apparently face if we can't stop the present deterioration.

Gordon Chase

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Pierre Salinger

Box 13
1963
Cuba 1964

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING
The White House - March 5, 1964 - 4:30 p.m.

OAS Action Against Cuba

Problem:

The President is requested to decide what action against Cuba the United States should seek to have the OAS take under the Rio Treaty in the light of OAS proof of Cuba's efforts to subvert and overthrow the Government of Venezuela.

Background:

At Venezuela's request, the Council of the OAS on December 3, 1964, invoking the Rio Treaty, appointed a five-nation commission (Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, Uruguay and the United States) to investigate Venezuela's charges of Cuban subversion, sparked by the discovery on Venezuela's coast of three tons of arms shipped from Cuba. The Commission's report, submitted February 18, 1964, concludes (Tab A) that Cuba, following a general policy of intervention in the other American Republics with Venezuela as a particular target, has been guilty of aggression through a subversive propaganda campaign, the supply of funds, the indoctrination and training of Venezuelan subversives in Cuba and particularly the clandestine shipment of arms to be used in a plan to capture Caracas, to prevent the holding of the December 1st elections and to seize control of the country.

Tab B is a draft resolution setting out the optimum steps which it is recommended we seek to persuade the other American Republics to approve.

SANITIZED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 88-167
By [illegible], NARA, Date 2-15-90

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intervals; not
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Box 1, "Miscellaneous"
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Tab C discusses the major elements of the proposed resolution, pointing up the basic issues involved in its key paragraphs.

Attachments:

1. Conclusions of Report of OAS Investigating Committee (Tab A).
2. Draft of Proposed Resolution Against Cuba under Rio Treaty (Tab B).
3. Memo re Proposed Resolution. (Tab C)

TAB A

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING
The White House - March 5, 1964 - 4:30 p.m.

CONCLUSIONS OF REPORT OF OAS INVESTIGATING COMMITTEE

A

In formulating its conclusions, the committee considers it pertinent to make some general observations on the policy of intervention in the hemisphere of the present Government of Cuba, which has been substantiated in the investigation of the charges made by Venezuela:

1. The present Government of Cuba since its institution in 1959 has carried on, supported, and directed in various ways a policy of intervention in the hemisphere through propaganda methods, provision of funds, training in sabotage and guerrilla operations, and the supply of arms to support those movements that seek to subvert national institutions through force in order to install communist regimes.

2. This support of subversion, which generally takes the form of political aggression, has had positive application in the Republic of Venezuela, the primary objective in Cuba's policy of expansion and ideological penetration in the hemisphere. The vast natural resources of Venezuela, its strategic importance in the hemisphere, and its status as a democratic country were factors that motivated the present Government of Cuba to make use of the subversive action of organizations that employ force and violence to overthrow that democratic government.

B

1. The Republic of Venezuela has been the target of a series of actions sponsored and directed by the Government of Cuba, openly intended to subvert Venezuelan institutions and to overthrow the democratic Government of Venezuela through terrorism, sabotage, assault, and guerrilla warfare.

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2. A characteristic manifestation of this policy of aggression has been the systematic and hostile propaganda campaign carried out through information organs that are under the control of the Government of Cuba and that are directed against Venezuelan institutions, the President of the Republic, and other high government officials, inciting the people of Venezuela to rebellion and, in addition, giving direct support to subversive movements.

3. Other manifestations of this policy of aggression are found in the supply of funds and the indoctrination and training in Cuba of numerous Venezuelans who later returned to their country to participate in subversive movements.

4. An important element in this intervention in Venezuela, directed by the Government of Cuba, was the shipment of arms that was found on the Peninsula of Paraguaná in the State of Falcón on November 1, 1963, close to the date of the general elections. The shipment was made up of arms originating in Cuba that were surreptitiously landed at a solitary spot on the coast, for the purpose of being used in subversive operations to overthrow the constitutional Government of Venezuela.

With respect to this shipment, the following facts are noteworthy:

a. The perforations and obliterations that were made on the various weapons in places where the Cuban coat of arms and other identification marks had been stamped, in an effort to hide their well-known Cuban origin.

b. The conditioning and packing of the arms for immediate use, the quantity and quality of the arms, and the instructions for their use, which were found in the hands of communist groups. These arms were to be used to support subversive activities and guerrilla action by organizations disciplined and trained for such purposes.

c. The discovery, at the same spot where the shipment of arms was found, of a boat with an outboard motor, which motor was sent from Montreal, Canada, to Havana by air on October 1, 1963, for delivery to the National Institute of Agrarian Reform of Cuba, an official institution of that country.

5. The policy of aggression on the part of the Government of Cuba was confirmed by the discovery on November 4, 1963, by Venezuelan authorities, of a plan of operations, the "Caracas Plan," prepared for the subversive action of the so-called "Armed Forces of National Liberation." This plan anticipated the use of arms similar in type and numerical proportion to the shipment of arms mentioned in the preceding paragraph. The objective of the plan was to capture the city of Caracas, to prevent the holding of elections on December 1, 1963, and to seize control of the country.

6. Consequently, the acts of intervention that have been outlined, and, in particular, the shipment of arms, constitute a policy of aggression on the part of the present Government of Cuba against the territorial integrity, the political sovereignty, and the stability of the democratic institutions of Venezuela.

February 18, 1964

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TAB B

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March 4, 1964

DRAFT RESOLUTION ON VENEZUELAN ARMS CACHE

1. RESOLVES to condemn the present Government of Cuba for the acts of aggression and intervention against the territorial integrity, the political sovereignty and the stability of the democratic institutions of Venezuela.

2. WARNS the present Government of Cuba to cease forthwith its aggression against governments of other American Republics; and

(a) Considering paragraph 3 of Resolution II adopted by the Eighth Meeting of Foreign Ministers acting as Organ of Consultation in application of the inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, 1/ agrees, pursuant to Article 6 of that Treaty, that, the inviolability and the integrity of the territory and the sovereignty and the political independence of an American State having been endangered by these acts of aggression and intervention which threaten the peace of America, measures set forth in

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1/ This preambulatory language might be placed in a whereas clause in the Resolution.

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Article 3 of the Treaty should be taken by the member states, acting individually or collectively, in the event that the Government of Cuba continues its aggression against other American States;

(b) immediately upon the taking of any such measures, the Council of the Organization, continuing to act provisionally as Organ of Consultation, shall meet to receive information concerning the measures taken and to further consider the matter.

3. RECOMMENDS that, in order to ensure that no arms, munitions, or implements of war of any kind proceeding directly or indirectly from Cuba are transported into their respective countries, and that there be no clandestine movement of persons reaching their shores from Cuba, the member states cooperate in establishing systems of aerial, sea and land surveillance in the waters off their coasts and along their land boundaries, in order to detect clandestine movement of persons or any suspected movement of arms, munitions or implements of war from Cuba to any other part of the hemisphere and to use such means as they may

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deem necessary, including the use of armed force, in areas within their jurisdiction to search for and seize any such suspected persons, arms, munitions, or implements of war.

4. DECIDES to apply the following measures:

(a) Rupture of diplomatic and consular relations by all American Republics with Cuba.

(b) Suspension of all trade by the American Republics with Cuba except in foodstuffs, medicines and medical supplies.

(c) Suspension of all air and sea transportation between the American Republics and Cuba, with the exception of such transportation undertaken for emergency reasons of a humanitarian nature.

5. REQUESTS all other states of the free world to take measures on their own of the type envisaged in paragraph 4 in order that the purpose of this resolution will be fully achieved.

6. RECOMMENDS that the member states adopt such measures as they may consider necessary, within their respective jurisdictions, to further the purposes of paragraphs 4(b) and 5.

7. URGES all the American Republics to increase their vigilance against the subversive activities of Castro-communist

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elements in this hemisphere and to take all appropriate defensive measures to counteract these activities, particularly those recommendations made by the Special Committee of the Council on Resolutions II and VIII of the 8th MFM.

8. <u>REQUESTS</u> the Secretary General of the OAS to inform the Security Council of the United Nations of this Resolution in accordance with Article 54 of the Charter of the United Nations.

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING
The White House - March 5, 1964 - 4:30 p.m.

Discussion of Proposed Resolution (Tab B)

1. The resolution as a whole is very strong. While we may be able, with firm and decisive leadership and diplomatic pressure to obtain the necessary thirteen votes, [redacted] will certainly strongly oppose many of the provisions (particularly paragraphs 2 and 4 a), and if these are approved, there is a possibility they might decline to carry them out. Because of this opposition, several other smaller countries will want to abstain on these and perhaps other key paragraphs. By committing ourselves to strong support of this resolution, we would thus be accepting the risk of a division in the CAS family. To some extent, this risk can be minimized by working quietly [redacted] in advance of setting a date for the CAS meeting, to obtain firm agreement on a specific draft. However, it must be borne in mind that once we press for such a strong draft -- and the text will almost certainly become publicly known after consultations begin -- we will have committed U.S. prestige with risk of its subsequent loss if we are unable to obtain the necessary votes and are obliged to retreat to less strong language.

1.3 (a)(5)

The most critical problem involves paragraph 2 of the resolution. This paragraph in effect says that in the event there should be another aggression by Cuba against an American Republic similar to the recent aggression against Venezuela, the United States would have advance Rio Treaty authorization to move militarily against Cuba itself without the need for calling another OAS meeting. On the other hand, it would leave the United States free to make this decision in the light of all the circumstances existing at the time. It should be noted, of course, that if evidence comes to light of further Cuban aggression and intervention in other American states, the paragraph will give strong impetus to those seeking prompt, decisive military action against the Castro regime. Pressures for action can be expected to be all the greater during an election year.

We

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1.3 (a)(5)

[redacted]

3. Paragraph 3 recommends the establishment of cooperative air, sea and land surveillance and detection systems to seek to prevent and thwart clandestine movements of arms and men. Surveillance would be triggered by intelligence or unusual behavior of vessels or aircraft which would then be shadowed to the territory of receiving countries where they would be intercepted and searched and any arms or persons seized by either the forces of the receiving countries or, as a result of bilateral agreements between us and receiving countries, by U.S. forces. It should be recognized that the effectiveness of any such system is open to question. Nevertheless, it is our present estimate that Castro will probably not attempt further arms shipments from Cuba in the immediate future and thus the surveillance system could be credited with controlling them.

4. Paragraph 4 (a) would require a break in diplomatic and consular relations with Cuba by the five American Republics which still maintain them (Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Uruguay). This would be dramatic evidence of Cuba's isolation and deny to it subversive facilities offered by its missions in Latin America.

1.3 (a)(5)

On the other hand, it would, of course, be strongly opposed [redacted] and it would thus be very difficult to obtain a politically desirable majority. Severance of relations would result in some (but acceptable) loss of intelligence facilities and of possibly useful political channels into Cuba.

5. Paragraph 4 (b) would require the suspension of all trade except in foodstuffs and medicine. Since the other American Republics have very little trade with Cuba in other than foodstuffs,

the

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the practical result would be only a slight reduction in Latin American trade with Cuba. The paragraph as now drafted conforms to present U.S. policy established in October 1960, under which non-subsidized foodstuffs and medicines are exportable to Cuba under general license. Recent developments concerning possible lard exports to Cuba from the United States have raised the question of the continuation of this policy. A modification in the present policy would require a corresponding change in the resolution.

6. Paragraphs 5 and 6 are designed to reinforce this trade embargo by directing a collective call to free world countries to take measures which will make the hemisphere's effort to isolate Cuba more effective, and by providing an umbrella for unilateral measures by OAS countries, [redacted] to tighten the embargo.

1.3 (a)(5)

7. Paragraph 4 (c) would require the suspension of all sea and air transportation with Cuba except for humanitarian reasons. In addition to affecting ships and aircraft of Cuba and OAS countries, this would mean that ships and aircraft of non-OAS countries could not stop at an OAS country port or airfield if proceeding enroute to or from Cuba. This would require action by the United States as well, since at present vessels may stop at U.S. ports enroute to or from Cuba, provided they do not pick up government-financed cargo. Such a move would heighten Cuba's isolation and reduce its ability to move subversive. It would, of course, create problems with our allies and have a negative effect on Cuban exile morale by closing an escape route.

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Mandatory Review
Case # NLJ 84-98
Document # 9a1 5

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING
The White House - March 5, 1964 - 4:30 p.m.

OAS Action Against Cuba

Problem:

The President is requested to decide what action against Cuba the United States should seek to have the OAS take under the Rio Treaty in the light of OAS proof of Cuba's efforts to subvert and overthrow the Government of Venezuela.

Background:

At Venezuela's request, the Council of the OAS on December 3, 1964, invoking the Rio Treaty, appointed a five-nation commission (Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, Uruguay and the United States) to investigate Venezuela's charges of Cuban subversion, sparked by the discovery on Venezuela's coast of three tons of arms shipped from Cuba. The Commission's report, submitted February 18, 1964, concludes (Tab A) that Cuba, following a general policy of intervention in the other American Republics with Venezuela as a particular target, has been guilty of aggression through a subversive propaganda campaign, the supply of funds, the indoctrination and training of Venezuelan subversives in Cuba and particularly the clandestine shipment of arms to be used in a plan to capture Caracas, to prevent the holding of the December 1st elections and to seize control of the country.

Tab B is a draft resolution setting out the optimum steps which it is recommended we seek to persuade the other American Republics to approve.

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Tab C discusses the major elements of the proposed resolution, pointing up the basic issues involved in its key paragraphs.

Attachments:

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2. Draft of Proposed Resolution Against Cuba under Rio Treaty (Tab B).
3. Memo re Proposed Resolution. (Tab C)

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TAB A

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING
The White House - March 5, 1964 - 4:30 p.m.

CONCLUSIONS OF REPORT OF OAS INVESTIGATING COMMITTEE

A

In formulating its conclusions, the committee considers it pertinent to make some general observations on the policy of intervention in the hemisphere of the present Government of Cuba, which has been substantiated in the investigation of the charges made by Venezuela:

1. The present Government of Cuba since its institution in 1959 has carried on, supported, and directed in various ways a policy of intervention in the hemisphere through propaganda methods, provision of funds, training in sabotage and guerrilla operations, and the supply of arms to support those movements that seek to subvert national institutions through force in order to install communist regimes.

2. This support of subversion, which generally takes the form of political aggression, has had positive application in the Republic of Venezuela, the primary objective in Cuba's policy of expansion and ideological penetration in the hemisphere. The vast natural resources of Venezuela, its strategic importance in the hemisphere, and its status as a democratic country were factors that motivated the present Government of Cuba to make use of the subversive action of organizations that employ force and violence to overthrow that democratic government.

B

1. The Republic of Venezuela has been the target of a series of actions sponsored and directed by the Government of Cuba, openly intended to subvert Venezuelan institutions and to overthrow the democratic Government of Venezuela through terrorism, sabotage, assault, and guerrilla warfare.

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2. A characteristic manifestation of this policy of aggression has been the systematic and hostile propaganda campaign carried out through information organs that are under the control of the Government of Cuba and that are directed against Venezuelan institutions, the President of the Republic, and other high government officials, inciting the people of Venezuela to rebellion and, in addition, giving direct support to subversive movements.

3. Other manifestations of this policy of aggression are found in the supply of funds and the indoctrination and training in Cuba of numerous Venezuelans who later returned to their country to participate in subversive movements.

4. An important element in this intervention in Venezuela, directed by the Government of Cuba, was the shipment of arms that was found on the Peninsula of Paraguaná in the State of Falcón on November 1, 1963, close to the date of the general elections. The shipment was made up of arms originating in Cuba that were surreptitiously landed at a solitary spot on the coast, for the purpose of being used in subversive operations to overthrow the constitutional Government of Venezuela.

With respect to this shipment, the following facts are noteworthy:

a. The perforations and obliterations that were made on the various weapons in places where the Cuban coat of arms and other identification marks had been stamped, in an effort to hide their well-known Cuban origin.

b. The conditioning and packing of the arms for immediate use, the quantity and quality of the arms, and the instructions for their use, which were found in the hands of communist groups. These arms were to be used to support subversive activities and guerrilla action by organizations disciplined and trained for such purposes.

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c. The discovery, at the same spot where the shipment of arms was found, of a boat with an outboard motor, which motor was sent from Montreal, Canada, to Havana by air on October 1, 1963, for delivery to the National Institute of Agrarian Reform of Cuba, an official institution of that country.

5. The policy of aggression on the part of the Government of Cuba was confirmed by the discovery on November 4, 1963, by Venezuelan authorities, of a plan of operations, the "Caracas Plan," prepared for the subversive action of the so-called "Armed Forces of National Liberation." This plan anticipated the use of arms similar in type and numerical proportion to the shipment of arms mentioned in the preceding paragraph. The objective of the plan was to capture the city of Caracas, to prevent the holding of elections on December 1, 1963, and to seize control of the country.

6. Consequently, the acts of intervention that have been outlined, and, in particular, the shipment of arms, constitute a policy of aggression on the part of the present Government of Cuba against the territorial integrity, the political sovereignty, and the stability of the democratic institutions of Venezuela.

February 18, 1964

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TAB B

CONFIDENTIAL

March 4, 1964

DRAFT RESOLUTION ON VENEZUELAN ARMS CACHE

1. RESOLVES to condemn the present Government of Cuba for the acts of aggression and intervention against the territorial integrity, the political sovereignty and the stability of the democratic institutions of Venezuela.

2. WARNS the present Government of Cuba to cease forthwith its aggression against governments of other American Republics; and

(a) Considering paragraph 3 of Resolution II adopted by the Eighth Meeting of Foreign Ministers acting as Organ of Consultation in application of the inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, [1/] agrees, pursuant to Article 6 of that Treaty, that, the inviolability and the integrity of the territory and the sovereignty and the political independence of an American State having been endangered by these acts of aggression and intervention which threaten the peace of America, measures set forth in

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1/ This preambulatory language might be placed in a whereas clause in the Resolution.

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Article 8 of the Treaty should be taken by the member states, acting individually or collectively, in the event that the Government of Cuba continues its aggression against other American States;

(b) immediately upon the taking of any such measures, the Council of the Organization, continuing to act provisionally as Organ of Consultation, shall meet to receive information concerning the measures taken and to further consider the matter.

3. RECOMMENDS that, in order to ensure that no arms, munitions, or implements of war of any kind proceeding directly or indirectly from Cuba are transported into their respective countries, and that there be no clandestine movement of persons reaching their shores from Cuba, the member states cooperate in establishing systems of aerial, sea and land surveillance in the waters off their coasts and along their land boundaries, in order to detect clandestine movement of persons or any suspected movement of arms, munitions or implements of war from Cuba to any other part of the hemisphere and to use such means as they may

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deem necessary, including the use of armed force, in areas within their jurisdiction to search for and seize any such suspected persons, arms, munitions, or implements of war.

4. DECIDES to apply the following measures:

(a) Rupture of diplomatic and consular relations by all American Republics with Cuba.

(b) Suspension of all trade by the American Republics with Cuba except in foodstuffs, medicines and medical supplies.

(c) Suspension of all air and sea transportation between the American Republics and Cuba, with the exception of such transportation undertaken for emergency reasons of a humanitarian nature.

5. REQUESTS all other states of the free world to take measures on their own of the type envisaged in paragraph 4 in order that the purpose of this resolution will be fully achieved.

6. RECOMMENDS that the member states adopt such measures as they may consider necessary, within their respective jurisdictions, to further the purposes of paragraphs 4(b) and 5.

7. URGES all the American Republics to increase their vigilance against the subversive activities of Castro-communist

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elements in this hemisphere and to take all appropriate defensive measures to counteract these activities, particularly those recommendations made by the Special Committee of the Council on Resolutions II and VIII of the 8th MFM.

8. REQUESTS the Secretary General of the OAS to inform the Security Council of the United Nations of this Resolution in accordance with Article 54 of the Charter of the United Nations.

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Tab C

[redacted]

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Tab C

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL MEETING
The White House - March 5, 1964 - 4:30 p.m.

Discussion of Proposed Resolution (Tab B)

1. The resolution as a whole is very strong. While we may be able, with firm and decisive leadership and diplomatic pressure to obtain the necessary thirteen votes, [redacted] will certainly strongly oppose many of the provisions (particularly paragraphs 2 and 4 a), and if these are approved, there is a possibility they might decline to carry them out. Because of this opposition, several other smaller countries will want to abstain on these and perhaps other key paragraphs. By committing ourselves to strong support of this resolution, we would thus be accepting the risk of a division in the OAS family. To some extent, this risk can be minimized by working quietly [redacted] in advance of setting a date for the OAS meeting, to obtain firm agreement on a specific draft. However, it must be borne in mind that once we press for such a strong draft -- and the text will almost certainly become publicly known after consultations begin -- we will have committed U.S. prestige with risk of its subsequent loss if we are unable to obtain the necessary votes and are obliged to retreat to less strong language.

The most critical problem involves paragraph 2 of the resolution. This paragraph in effect says that in the event there should be another aggression by Cuba against an American Republic similar to the recent aggression against Venezuela, the United States would have advance Rio Treaty authorization to move militarily against Cuba itself without the need for calling another OAS meeting. On the other hand, it would leave the United States free to make this decision in the light of all the circumstances existing at the time. It should be noted, of course, that if evidence comes to light of further Cuban aggression and intervention in other American states, the paragraph will give strong impetus to those seeking prompt, decisive military action against the Castro regime. Pressures for action can be expected to be all the greater during an election year.

We

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 88-41
By [illegible], NARA, Date 2-13-90

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[redacted]

3. Paragraph 3 recommends the establishment of cooperative air, sea and land surveillance and detection systems to seek to prevent and thwart clandestine movements of arms and men. Surveillance would be triggered by intelligence or unusual behavior of vessels or aircraft which would then be shadowed to the territory of receiving countries where they would be intercepted and searched and any arms or persons seized by either the forces of the receiving countries or, as a result of bilateral agreements between us and receiving countries, by U.S. forces. It should be recognized that the effectiveness of any such system is open to question. Nevertheless, it is our present estimate that Castro will probably not attempt further arms shipments from Cuba in the immediate future and thus the surveillance system could be credited with controlling them.

4. Paragraph 4 (a) would require a break in diplomatic and consular relations with Cuba by the five American Republics which still maintain them (Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Uruguay). This would be dramatic evidence of Cuba's isolation and deny to it subversive facilities offered by its missions in Latin America. On the other hand, it would, of course, be strongly opposed [redacted] and it would thus be very difficult to obtain a politically desirable majority. Severance of relations would result in some (but acceptable) loss of intelligence facilities and of possibly useful political channels into Cuba.

5. Paragraph 4 (b) would require the suspension of all trade except in foodstuffs and medicine. Since the other American Republics have very little trade with Cuba in other than foodstuffs,

the

the practical result would be only a slight reduction in Latin American trade with Cuba. The paragraph as now drafted conforms to present U.S. policy established in October 1960, under which non-subsidized foodstuffs and medicines are exportable to Cuba under general license. Recent developments concerning possible lard exports to Cuba from the United States have raised the question of the continuation of this policy. A modification in the present policy would require a corresponding change in the resolution.

6. Paragraphs 5 and 6 are designed to reinforce this trade embargo by directing a collective call to free world countries to take measures which will make the hemisphere's effort to isolate Cuba more effective, and by providing an umbrella for unilateral measures by OAS countries, [redacted] to tighten the embargo.

7. Paragraph 4 (c) would require the suspension of all sea and air transportation with Cuba except for humanitarian reasons. In addition to affecting ships and aircraft of Cuba and OAS countries, this would mean that ships and aircraft of non-OAS countries could not stop at an OAS country port or airfield if proceeding enroute to or from Cuba. This would require action by the United States as well, since at present vessels may stop at U.S. ports enroute to or from Cuba, provided they do not pick up government-financed cargo. Such a move would heighten Cuba's isolation and reduce its ability to move subversive. It would, of course, create problems with our allies and have a negative effect on Cuban exile morale by closing an escape route.

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Case # NLJ 86-188
Document # 46

46

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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March 11, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: Cuba -- Miscellaneous

[redacted]

(a,5)

2. OAS Resolution -- Ward Allen and Tom Mann seem to be in charge on this one.

Ward tells me that, so far as we know, the Venezuelans have not yet surfaced the resolution to the OAR's; GOV missions are expected to do so shortly. Ward is now working on a paper which recommends U. S. action once the Venezuelans have surfaced the resolution. He suggests that, 36 to 48 hours after the surfacing, U.S. posts abroad should call on host OAR's. Also, the Secretary might call in OAS Ambassadors and talk to them.

GC

Gordon Chase

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 86-188
By cg, NARA, Date 4-13-87

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 17, 1964

DECLASSIFIED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NLJ 88-41
By [illegible] NARA, Date 2-1-12

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: OAS Resolution

The Chiefs of Mission Conference on Tuesday discussed the OAS resolution.

1. Tom Mann led off by explaining the meaning of Article 2 (the warning paragraph). Our basic problem in 1964 is that we have our hands tied by the 19th century concept that only "armed attack" is aggression. We need to build a body of law which defines subversion as aggression and which will give us a juridical cover in the event that we need one. Article 2 is a step in this direction.

2. Generally speaking, the discussion among the Chiefs of Missions produced the following line-up vis a vis the present OAS resolution:

(a) Argentina - Would probably go along with the resolution but would have misgivings about Article 2. However, if we get the military to put pressure on the GOA, the GOA would probably come along. We should note, however, that we have been trying to avoid the enhancement of the military position.

(b) Bolivia - It is not clear that Bolivia will attend a meeting of consultation on this subject, although the prospects are better than even. The Bolivians would prefer to see a soft resolution but Ambassador Henderson feels that there is some flexibility in the Bolivian position.

(c) Brazil - Ambassador Gordon was sure that Brazil would vote against the resolution. The Brazilians would object strenuously to Article 2, as well as to Article 4(a) (breaking diplomatic relations); they might go along with steps that were clearly anti-subversive in character (there were doubters on this). The Ambassador didn't mind isolating Brazil if a large majority favored the resolution. A bare majority, however, did not seem like a smart idea.

(d) Chile - Ambassador Cole felt that the Chileans might conceivably be able to buy Article 2 but would give us real trouble on Article 4(a).

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(e) Colombia - Would go along with a tough resolution, although it would look closely at Article 2.

(f) Costa Rica - Would go along with a tough resolution.

(g) Dominican Republic - Would go along with a tough resolution.

(h) El Salvador - Would go along with a tough resolution.

(i) Ecuador - Would go along with a tough resolution.

(j) Guatemala - Would go along with a tough resolution.

(k) Haiti - Would go along with a tough resolution although it might cost us some project aid if the vote is close and we need the vote.

(l) Honduras - Would go along with a tough resolution.

(m) Mexico - Would probably fight a tough resolution. However, it is not certain; the Mexican OAS Ambassador indicated to Tom Mann that the GOM could conceivably buy a slightly watered down version of Article 2.

(n) Nicaragua - Would go along with a tough resolution.

(o) Panama - No discussion of Panama.

(p) Paraguay - Would go along with a tough resolution although it would be painful for them because they are sensitive to Brazilian power.

(q) Peru - Might not be happy with Article 2; the Peruvians are sensitive about intervention. However, they would probably go along with the majority.

(r) Uruguay - Would much prefer a soft resolution but it is conceivable that they will go along with a tough resolution.

(s) Venezuela - Cannot vote.

3. In sum, assuming the Bolivans attend the meeting, the picture looks roughly as follows at this very preliminary stage: (the Venezuelans have not yet surfaced the resolution to the OAR's):

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(i) Eleven of the countries will probably go along with the resolution as it stands. They are Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay, and the United States.

(ii) Two of the countries will probably go along with the crowd. They are Argentina and Peru.

(iii) Four of the countries are not likely to go along with the resolution but this is not a foregone conclusion. These countries are Mexico, Chile, Bolivia, and Uruguay.

(iv) One country will definitely not go along with a tough resolution - Brazil.

(v) Panama is probably a question mark at present. Could possibly abstain.

4. Most of the Ambassadors, with the notable exception of Ambassador Gordon, seemed to feel that we should go with a majority rather than for a near unanimous vote. One general theme seemed to be that the Latin Americans look to us for leadership. Also, many Latin Americans might complain, but deep down, they won't mind a tough resolution. It should be noted, however, that all the Ambassadors did not speak to this subject and that no clear consensus was developed at the meeting.

5. Sentiment at the meeting in favor of trying to sell a tough resolution was stronger than the experts expected (e.g. Ward Allen).

Gordon Chase

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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March 26, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. BUNDY

SUBJECT: OAS Resolution

1. Attached is State's cable, for clearance, telling the Latin American posts to start their soundings on the OAS resolution. The cable leaves us pretty flexible and I, for one, have no problems with it.

2. I went to the LAPC meeting this afternoon which discussed the OAS resolution. In large part, it was devoted to a rehash of the meaning of Article 2 (the warning article). The sum of the meeting was that we are very flexible until we see what our soundings produce.

Tom Mann did introduce one interesting thought. He has apparently been talking to the Mexicans and he feels that there is a fair chance that the Mexicans might agree to a version of Article 2, particularly if we can play up the idea of Cuban intervention; the Mexicans are apparently bugs on non-intervention. Tom went on to say if we can get Mexico tied on, it would really shake up the remainder of the "soft five."

GC

Gordon Chase

cc: Mr. Dungan

P.S. Copy of resolution is attached.

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NLJ 88-41
By ~~dlj~~ NARA. Date 2-12-90

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BOX 25, COUNTRY FILE - CUBA
NSF FILE, LOS2

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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March 26, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR

Mr. Bundy

Subject: OAS Resolution - Clearance of Cable

1. This cable, with slight changes, will be coming over here officially for dearance this afternoon.

2. There is an LAPC meeting this afternoon at 4:30 to discuss the OAS resolution on Cuba. You may want to hold off on White House clearance until after this meeting. I plan to go over and listen in: I assume Ralph will be there also.

Gordon Chase

cc: Mr. Dungan returned instrument 11 a/64
Mr. Bromley Smith

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E.O. 12356, sec. 3.4
NLJ [illegible]
By [illegible] NARA, Date [illegible]

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June 26, 1964

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT (For Information Only)

SUBJECT: OAS Resolution on the Cuban Arms Cache in Venezuela

1. A meeting of OAS Foreign Ministers (MFM), probably lasting three or four days will start in Washington on July 21 to consider action against Cuba on the Venezuelan arms cache issue. The following is meant to bring you up to date.

2. The OAS countries are likely to discuss and take action on the following three resolutions when they meet on July 21.

(a) Resolution I recommends that member states cooperate in surveillance to detect the subversive movements of men and arms between Cuba and Latin America. The resolution also recommends that OAS countries, which still maintain diplomatic and air relations with Cuba, break such relations. It goes on to require member states to suspend all sea and commercial relations (except food and medicines) with Cuba.

We can live with this resolution and there is a very good chance that it can be passed with a strong majority; at present, only Chile and Mexico, both of which have domestic political problems, are opposed. It is quite possible, moreover, that, by the date of the MFM, Mexico may change its mind and decide to abstain or, conceivably, to vote favorably.

(b) Resolution II issues the warning and establishes the principle that the OAS regards subversion as aggression and that future acts of Cuban subversion will trigger an immediate OAS meeting to agree on measures to be taken against the guilty party. The resolution goes on to say that the above OAS procedure does not limit the right of the victim of such aggression and the right of other states, at the victim's request, to take appropriate measures inherent in the right of individual or collective self-defense.

As the resolution now stands, we can live with it and can probably get a substantial majority to vote favorably (e.g. all but Chile and probably Mexico). However, we may get some heat at the MFM to weaken the resolution in two ways. First, most of the OAR's would like to generalize the warning language so that it pertains to subversion by both the left and right. We prefer the language to pertain more sharply to Cuba -- so Cuba will feel the heat directly and

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unequivocally and so there will be no chance (although already unlikely) that the resolution will be turned against us because of our own "rightist" subversive activities against Cuba. Second, Chile would like to limit the right of individual and collective self-defense in the event of subversive aggression. We and most other OAR's oppose the Chilean position.

(c) Resolution III urges non-OAS Free World countries to cooperate with the OAS in its economic denial program against Cuba. It also recommends that OAS countries take necessary measures to achieve non-OAS Free World cooperation in this area. This resolution should pass easily. At present, there seems to be little opposition.

3. If we get the three resolutions as they now stand, with the majorities which we now estimate, we will have done fairly well. While we will not be able to point to an imminent overthrow of the Castro regime and to a complete cessation of Castro-Communist subversion in Latin America, we will be able to point to some movement towards a number of intermediate objectives, achieved without excessively straining the unity of the OAS.

First, Cuba will be further isolated. The break in the remaining commercial and sea relations and further possible diplomatic breaks, at a minimum, will hurt Castro psychologically. Second, the spread of Cuban subversion will be impeded. The warning resolution might inhibit Castro's will to spread subversion while the establishment of a surveillance system and the isolation measures will make it physically somewhat more difficult to move subversive men, funds, and arms between Cuba and Latin America. Third, the warning resolution will give us some juridical basis for and pre-position the OAS to use force against future Cuban subversion, if it is deemed desirable to do so. Fourth, Cuba's economic difficulties will be increased marginally by the break in commercial and sea relations with the OAS. To the extent we decide to use Resolution III as a lever, multilaterally if possible, on non-OAS Free World countries to reduce commercial relations with Cuba, Cuba's economic difficulties will be further increased. Fifth, the economic burden to the Soviet Union will be increased marginally -- to the extent that we can continue to force Cuban commercial activities into abnormal, uneconomic channels.

McG. B.

COPY FOR [illegible]

1667

Bundy
cc Duncan

ADDRESS OFFICIAL COMMUNICATIONS TO
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

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March 26, 1964

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MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Circular Telegram to ARA Posts on OAS Resolution on Cuban Arms Cache

There is enclosed the telegram which we propose to send to our diplomatic posts in Latin America, instructing our Ambassadors to support the Venezuelan initiative on the OAS Resolution on the Cuban arms cache case. The telegram is being sent to you for clearance.

Richard K. Nobbe for
Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosure:

Circular Telegram to
Latin American Diplomatic
Posts

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR
REVIEWED by John DATE 7-16-88
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BOX 25, Country File - Cuba, NSF, LBJL

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CIRCULAR PRIORITY

ALL AMA DIPLOMATIC POSTS, USUN, CINCLANT
FOR POLAD, CINCSO FOR POLAD, Amcon Panama

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We understand COV has now approved draft resolution on Cuba substantially as contained DEPCIRTEL 1626 and has instructed its missions OAAs present to Foomins with request for support. At appropriate interval following presentation by your Venezuelan colleague, please raise with Foomin.

You should state GOV has consulted US on major points included in res and that US wholeheartedly in agreement with basic Venez approach. We hopeful it will be possible achieve general consensus for action along these lines. In consultation GOV, we plan follow up consultations here through COAS Reps on drafting changes.

As appropriate, you should point out that in US view report of OAS Committee leaves no doubt GOC culpability and makes abundantly clear Castro's continuing campaign bring about overthrow govts OAAs through subversion. Fact he failed in Venez in no way lessens serious~~matter~~ness, nor should it be interpreted that

ARA:RPA:WPAllen:eh 3/24/64 ARA - Thomas C. Mann

COAS - Amb. Bunker CCA - Mr. Crimmins

White House

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that he will not try it again elsewhere. There equally no doubt this pattern subversive activities constitutes QUOTE aggression UNQUOTE under Rio Treaty if concept is to have any practical meaning at all in present day international situation where international communist movement uses indirect means to extend its power.

Thus, in our view all ARs have real responsibility agree upon strong meaningful action under Rio Treaty to make very clear to Castro that hemisphere will not continue tolerate intervention and promotion of subversion and violence in OARs and he runs very serious risks if he persists in doing so. This is basic rationale for para 2 of draft resolution which would not obligate any AR take any action at any time, but would simply provide present authorization for future action on voluntary basis if Cuban aggression continues. In our view, this would constitute most salutary warning and effective deterrent.

Rationale of measures contained in para 4 is obviously 2-fold one of lessening Cuba's ability to export subversion and of seeking to increase economic cost to USSR of maintaining its satellite this hemisphere. Paras 4(a) and (c) will deprive Castro of some important remaining direct channels he has in hemisphere for recruitment of trainees,

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trainees, distribution of funds and propaganda, transmission of guidance and instructions to extremist elements, and transportation of persons from OASs to Cuba. It also will demonstrate to Castro - as collective OAS action unanimously approved 6th MFM did to Trujillo in 1960 for masterminding assassination attempt against Betancourt - that hemisphere will not permit intervention to go unpunished. Para 4(b), we recognize, will have little practical effect insofar as OAR trade with Cuba is concerned because this largely foodstuffs and medicines. However, taken in conjunction para 5, we regard it as highly useful means for demonstrating to other free world countries now trading with Cuba in goods critical to Cuban economy that hemisphere which is victim of Castro subversion seriously concerned by their buttressing Castro regime through trade, thereby placing him in better position to promote subversive activities. In this regard we believe paras 4(c) and 5 reflect views expressed by Betancourt on several occasions before leaving office that he hoped western govts still trading with Cuba will take into account very justifiable reaction of GOV to Cuban attack against its sovereignty and democratic institutions and that if that trade continues they may have to choose between trading with Cuba or with Venezuela.

[illegible] Le Fournin

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If Fonmin should raise question as to whether action should be taken by special MFM/OC under Rio Treaty or by COAS, acting provisionally as OC, you should state that in our view res such as proposed merits action at Fonmin level and our present inclination is to support GOV in this respect. However, we more interested in content strong, meaningful res than in level at which it approved and therefore possibility of action by COAS/OC not excluded.

Report reaction soonest.

GP-3.

END

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March 26, 1964

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LATIN AMERICAN POLICY COMMITTEE: ACTION MINUTES, MEETING #81

TOPIC: Approved NSC Paper on OAS Action Against Cuba

PARTICIPANTS:
ARA - Mr. Mann, Mr. Adams, Mr. Stephansky, Mr. Allen, Mr. Crimmins, Mr. Bowdler, Mr. Lister, Mr. Pryce, Mr. Frey

INR - Mr. Hughes, Mr. Plank

S/P - Mr. Rostow, Mr. Ford

AID - Mr. Rogers, Mr. Taylor

USIA - Mr. Ryan

CIA - Mr. Brown, Mr. Herbert, Mr. Bolton

DOD - Mr. Sloan, Mr. Califano

JCS - General Turnage

WHITE HOUSE - Mr. Chase

The background and prospects of the approved NSC paper on OAS action against Cuba was discussed.

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WASHINGTON 25, D. C.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON

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June 26, 1964

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24

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. McGEORGE BUNDY
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Draft Resolutions for Consideration by Ninth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs in Connection with the Venezuelan Charges of Cuban Aggression and Intervention.

The Council of the Organization of American States called today for a Meeting of Foreign Ministers of the Member States, to be held at the Pan American Union in Washington, beginning on July 21, 1964, to take action on the Venezuelan charges of Cuban aggression and intervention. The Venezuelan request for such action was made to the Council of the OAS on December 3, 1963.

A drafting group of several Representatives on the Council of the OAS has prepared three draft resolutions for consideration at that Meeting. The group included our Representative, Ambassador Bunker; Ambassador Lavalle of Peru, who is Chairman of the Council; Ambassador Sanchez Gavito of Mexico; Ambassador Vázquez Carrizosa of Colombia; and Ambassador Sevilla-Sacasa of Nicaragua.

The texts, as prepared by the drafting group, are substantially similar to those we had previously prepared in conjunction with the Government of Venezuela. English texts of the three resolutions, as distributed informally to all delegations to the OAS today, are enclosed. The following comments cover matters of particular interest to us:

The draft of Resolution 1, in paragraphs 3 and 4, now calls for a mandatory suspension of all commercial relations

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BOX 25, Country File: Cuba, NSF, LBJL

and sea transportation between members of the OAS and Cuba. It recommends the break of diplomatic relations and suspension of air communications. This is a middle ground between the Venezuelan desire that all measures be mandatory, and the Mexican-Chilean position that they should all be only recommendations.

We have found considerable opposition among other Delegations to the OAS over the inclusion in paragraph 2 of the Declaratory portion of Resolution 2, of the phrase "by governments whose acts are incompatible with the principles and objectives of the Inter-American System". We have thus far insisted on its retention, on the grounds that the Resolution should in some manner be directed specifically at Cuba.

There has also been some objection to paragraph 4 of the same section of Resolution 2, on grounds that it is too sweeping a declaration of the inherent right of self-defense, and might be considered as a "blank check". The Chilean Representative, who is most strongly opposed to the paragraph, has argued that it might be construed as authorizing preventative war.

As it now stands, the concluding phrase of that paragraph makes it clearly consistent with the language concerning self-defense in the Rio Treaty (Article 3 (4)) and the United Nations Charter (Article 51).

These texts have been agreed to by us as working drafts for presentation at the Meeting of Foreign Ministers. They were distributed today to Representatives of all the OAS Members for submission to their governments. No government, including our own, is officially committed to them. Such commitments will be made only by the Foreign Ministers. We hope that they can be approved by substantial majorities, and would oppose any attempts to weaken them.

Benjamin H. Read
Executive Secretary

Enclosures:
Draft resolutions.

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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Director of Intelligence
and Research

34 37

Research Memorandum

RAR-30, September 14, 1964

To : The Secretary
Through: S/S
From : INR - Thomas L. Hughes Thomas L. Hughes

88-42
37

Subject: The Significance of the July 1964 OAS Foreign Ministers Meeting

K

The recent OAS Foreign Ministers meeting generally furthered the ends of US policy toward Cuba, but it also had a wider significance. This paper summarizes what happened during and after the meeting, describes official and unofficial reactions, and examines its impact upon the Cuban regime and upon the OAS.

ABSTRACT

The OAS condemned Cuba for aggression--for planting an arms cache in Venezuela in connection with a Cuban supported plan to overthrow the Venezuelan Government--and resolved to impose strong sanctions against the Castro regime. Reaction to the move in the free world ranged from enthusiastic support in most of Latin America to skeptical deprecation in parts of Western Europe.

Chile, Bolivia and Uruguay voted against the imposition of sanctions but have since agreed to comply. Mexico has declared that it will not cooperate.

The OAS sanctions should help to disrupt Cuban subversive activities in Latin America and to further discourage Castro from pursuing these activities. They will have little immediate effect upon the Cuban economy,

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but, if Cuba's European trading partners can be convinced to cooperate with the OAS, the economy will be seriously affected.

The OAS meeting was a substantial victory for the US and Venezuela. The OAS suffered no significant loss of prestige or effectiveness, despite the disunity exhibited at the meeting and, from the OAS majority point of view, it gained considerable cohesion and credibility as a respectable international organization.

The resolutions as passed

On July 26, 1964, the OAS adopted two principle resolutions which declared Cuba guilty of aggression, and condemned it for planting an arms cache in Venezuela. These resolutions warned the Cuban Government that the OAS countries would meet new cases of aggression with armed force if necessary and urged all countries sympathetic to the OAS to help make the OAS sanctions effective. One resolution called upon all OAS members to apply the following mandatory sanctions against Cuba: suspension of sea (not air) transportation; suspension of trade (except for food, medicine and medical equipment sent to Cuba for humanitarian reasons); non-maintenance of diplomatic and consular relations with Cuba (meaning severance of relations by countries having such relations and non-establishment of relations by those which do not maintain them). Mexico, Chile, Uruguay and Bolivia opposed the principal resolution on sanctions. Argentina abstained on those portions of the resolution imposing sanctions. Venezuela, the complaining country, was well satisfied with the resolutions as passed. It got nearly all that it had asked.

Press reaction

Worried support from Latin America. Except in those countries which refused to support sanctions against Cuba, most of the non-Communist Latin American press enthusiastically approved the measures. However, some writers feared that the sanctions would not adversely affect the Castro regime to a substantial degree and that the sanctions would not be applied conscientiously by the OAS members. There was fear also that the voting pattern at the meeting heralded a permanent split in the OAS, into pro- and anti-Cuban camps.

Skepticism in Canada and Europe. The Canadian and Western European press was generally skeptical about the outcome of the OAS meeting and cynical about US motives concerning it. Phrases such as "half success", "compromise", and "half measures" characterized the non-Communist editorial reaction to the meeting. Toronto's nationalistic, influential Globe and Mail was unusually critical; it called the meeting a "working demonstration of US colonialism". Some Belgian, British and German newspapers termed the US policy toward Cuba shortsighted in its implacable, "brutal" resolve to destroy Castro.

Compliance with the resolutions

The OAS majority. All the countries which voted for sanctions against Cuba, along with Argentina, had already broken diplomatic relations with Cuba before the Meeting of Foreign Ministers. Trade with Cuba had nearly ground to a halt by 1964; total official trade with the OAS majority amounted to no more than about one hundred

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thousand dollars in 1963. Overt (as opposed to covert) air and sea transport was nearly non-existent. During the OAS meeting, the majority sought generally to have its own practices regarding the severance of all contacts with Cuba adopted by the four reluctant countries.

Efforts of the majority, including the US, are now directed toward cutting Cuban trade with Japan and with Western European countries. Cuba has expanded trade ties with these countries, in order to replace those lost in the Western Hemisphere and to decrease its dependence on the Soviet Union.

The reluctant minority. Subsequent to the OAS vote on Cuba, most observers thought that even the countries which voted not to impose sanctions might nevertheless comply with the OAS decision. However, a week after the meeting, Mexico surprisingly announced that it would not comply. Its immediate reasons were politically motivated, though it based its refusal upon the international legal principle of "non-intervention". Mexico also announced that it would reverse its position if the International Court of Justice were to approve the OAS action, but Mexico made it clear that it would not petition the Court for such approval.

At the time of Mexico's announcing its decision not to comply with the OAS, the Mexican Foreign Ministry may have thought that it could discourage other reluctant countries from complying with the OAS by taking the first step in the other direction. However, time has proved that the Mexicans were wrong, and now they stand alone against the OAS decision.

The Mexican position has created much ill will in Latin America. Anti-Mexican feeling has appeared in Costa Rica, where violence was directed against the Mexican Embassy, and in Guatemala, where the Constituent Assembly adopted a resolution denouncing the Mexican attitude. High government officials in Colombia, Ecuador and Venezuela have sharply criticized the Mexican stand, and the responsible Latin American press calls it inflexible, "egoistic" and "absurd".

A week after the OAS meeting, Chile broke with Cuba; this was a surprise since Chile was not expected to take a position regarding compliance with the resolutions until after its September national election. Bolivia reluctantly followed suit the next week, amid

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recriminations from nationalists and leftists who complained of "pressures" from the US. For a time, Uruguay may have considered requesting the UN Security Council to ask the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion upon the legality of the OAS action. In early September 1964, however, Uruguay announced that it would comply with the OAS decision.

Impact upon the Cuban regime

Disruptions of Cuban and Castroist activities in Latin America. The removal of Cuban embassies from Latin America will help to disrupt Cuban activities in the hemisphere. The Cuban propaganda effort will also be adversely affected, by removal of purveying agencies and the exit of Cuban propagandists. However, some Cubans attached to trade delegations, international organizations and the like, will remain.

Transfer of funds from Cuba to Castroist groups in Latin American countries will probably remain unaffected. Transfers can be made to banks in such Latin American countries that have correspondent banks in Cuba or other countries. Funds now carried in Cuban diplomatic pouches could presumably be carried in Soviet or other Communist pouches to their destinations in Latin America.

What little Cuban-inspired transport of weapons and other equipment that does take place in support of insurgency in Latin America should be adversely affected. Severance of diplomatic relations will cut some of the communication links which are vital to effective arms transport and delivery. Suspension of all sea transport should cut down on the number of weapons which are disguised or included in other cargoes.

Movement of persons by air from Latin America to Cuba, or behind the Iron Curtain, will be little affected. Present air connections would remain intact. Frequent flights to and from Mexico, Spain and Prague, carrying passengers and mail, remain in operation.

Effect on Castro's image at home. Thinking Cubans may feel that Castro's position, as regards the hemisphere, and his self-righteous hostility toward some American republics are somewhat less justified than before. Because most of the OAS has now formally condemned him and agreed to impose sanctions against him, Castro can no longer easily claim that the US and a few small dictatorships have combined to frustrate his efforts and threaten his regime.

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On the other hand, the OAS may have provided Castro with an added justification for tightening controls, and Castro can explain away food and other shortages to his more ignorant audiences in terms of these new restrictions.

Effect upon the Cuban economy. The Cuban economy will not be affected immediately by the OAS sanctions, even if all member countries were to comply fully with the resolutions. Trade with Latin America makes up a very small percentage of total Cuban trade; the adverse affects of the severance of Latin American trade relations will be more psychological than economic.

However, the OAS sanctions may have two delayed effects of greater significance; (1) Castro will be forced to pay precious hard currency, for any food or medicine which he wishes to buy from the hemisphere, because he will not be able to export goods to the hemisphere to earn soft currencies. This will stop barter trade with Latin America and it may further curtail his trade with Europe, for lack of hard currency. (2) The OAS sober repudiation of Castro, and an OAS resolution specifically calling upon democratic states to cooperate with the organization, may aid the hemisphere in discouraging expansion of Cuban-European trade. The Europeans will no longer be able to say: "You trade with Castro, why shouldn't we?".

Effect upon Castro. The OAS resolutions were the latest in a series of political setbacks for Castro. His program of insurgency in Latin America is not going well; he must submit to the humiliation of US U-2 flights; his recent overtures toward rapprochement with the US have been rejected; and, in spite of considerable effort on his part, the OAS has adopted strong, hostile resolutions against him. The OAS action has probably further dampened Castro's interest in pursuing his campaign of insurgency and propaganda against Latin America. The impact on Castro of the OAS action would be greatly increased if Mexico should break with him and apply sanctions in the future.

Impact on the OAS as an organization

Before the meeting, some delegations--notably the Argentines and Brazilians--were most concerned about the "unity" of the OAS and the effects of an less-than-unanimous vote on the future of the organization. Both delegations tried to work for a compromise which would result in a unanimous vote; their efforts were apparently the result of a miscalculation about the depth of feeling on both sides concerning the issues involved. From the start, Mexico, Uruguay and Chile were stoutly opposed to mandatory sanctions against Cuba. But many countries

on the Venezuelan side would settle for little less than total mandatory political and economic isolation of Cuba.

Before the votes were taken, two small modifications of the language of the resolution on sanctions were made. It is possible that the same vote would have resulted if there had been no modifications. As results of the modifications: (1) Mexico was not pressured to sever its air connections with Cuba; (2) The OAS ordered the reluctant countries "not to maintain" relations with Cuba instead of ordering them to "break" relations. This language was chosen partly to salve minority sensibilities--the Mexicans thought that a resolution to "break" would be pointed more at them than at Cuba.

On balance, the meeting resulted in a victory for Venezuela, the US, and those countries that are most concerned about the threat of Castro's subversion and propaganda efforts. At the same time, the OAS has probably gained some cohesion and effectiveness; and it is unlikely that its reputation outside of the hemisphere has been seriously harmed.

A decision of the OAS has considerable moral and political power. There are indications that some important people in Uruguay (and a very few in Mexico) are uncomfortable with the position which their countries took at the meeting and with their reluctance to comply with the OAS decision. Serious differences of opinion have arisen in the Uruguayan National Council of Government and in the press. Mexican public opinion, however, generally supports the government position (a state of affairs brought about partly by governmental influence over the press). Mexico's respect for "non-intervention" and its exalted position above mere political quarrels are myths which the Mexican public generally believes.

In spite of the pressures created by the OAS decision in the reluctant countries, there is no sign that any of them intend to limit their participation in the OAS or its affiliated agencies. Rather, the majority consensus was accepted without pyrotechnics from the reluctant countries, and with no apparent loss of confidence in the future of the organization. The OAS may now be sufficiently mature to tolerate lively debate and dissenting positions.

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Mandatory Review
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MEMORANDUM ON SOME BASIC ISSUES IN THE CUBAN PROBLEM REQUIRING POLICY DECISIONS

OAS Action on Venezuelan Arms Cache

The report of the OAS Investigating Committee, which finds Cuba guilty of intervention and aggression against Venezuela, confronts us with these issues:

1. the sanctions we would like to see applied;

2. the vote which would be politically acceptable to us; and

3. the forum in which action should be taken: a Meeting of Foreign Ministers or the Council, acting provisionally as Organ of Consultation.

These issues are discussed in detail in Section I of the study included under Tab B.

The range of sanctions which might be taken in this case are included in the attached draft resolution (Tab A). These measures pose the following substantive problems on which policy decisions are necessary:

1. Should we in seeking OAS approval of a system of collective surveillance against Cuban arms shipments try:

a. to obtain authorization to stop and search, using force if necessary on the high seas, vessels of OAS flag countries, including Cuba, suspected of carrying arms; or

b. to limit action in international waters to surveillance of suspected vessels or aircraft, with search and seizure to be carried out by the territorial state once the vessel or aircraft has entered its national jurisdiction.

2. Should we in seeking to suspend air and sea transportation between the OAS members and Cuba close OAS country

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seaports to ships of non-OAS countries going to and from Cuba in continuous voyage. This would result in a significant extension of our own controls on shipping which touches at both Cuban and U.S. ports.

The procedural issues requiring policy decisions are:

1. Should we press for action against Cuba at the MFM level where expectations for strong measures will be heightened or should we try to have the case handled by the COAS/OC.

2. Should we encourage the Venezuelans to press for the maximum package of measures as reflected in the draft resolution, knowing that we may well have difficulty in obtaining such measures as surveillance with use of force on the high seas, a break in diplomatic relations, and a suspension of trade, and that our margin of votes for a politically acceptable majority (the requisite 2/3 plus either Brazil, Chile or Mexico) may be very slim. The Panama crisis has complicated this aspect.

We naturally would want to obtain as many of the measures covered in the draft resolution as possible, subject to the policy decisions on the items noted above. The components of a satisfactory OAS package will depend, however, on the nature of the surveillance system authorized. If surveillance is with use of force on the high seas, we might accept (1) suspension of trade by OAS countries with Cuba, except for food and medicines; (2) condemnation of Cuba; and (3) reaffirmation of OAS anti-subversion measures as the components of one type of minimum package. If surveillance is without use of force, the minimum package should include suspension of air and sea transportation, in addition to suspension of trade with Cuba, condemnation and reaffirmation of OAS anti-subversion measures.

A decision to suspend trade with Cuba, except for food and medicines, and to close airports and seaports to vessels and aircraft in the Cuban trade would have particular utility in our efforts to restrict economic ties of free-world countries with Cuba by establishing a clear hemispheric position.

Counter-Measures Against Free-World Economic Ties with Cuba

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C&S Action Against Cuba

I. Measures to Prevent Export of Arms and Implements of War by Cuba (Arms "Quarantine" or Surveillance System)

A. Issues Raised

1. Basic Assumption

Action of varying kinds set out below will be taken against vessels of cooperating OAS countries and of Cuba, i.e., not against Bloc (including Chicom) vessels or against free-world vessels.

2. Use of Force

a. General

Question of use of force arises with respect to all arms "quarantine" or surveillance arrangements except one in which force used only within territory of receiving state.

b. Considerations

(1) Reluctance of OAR's to agree to use of force

- Bare minimum (two-thirds) would support, and even this would be difficult to obtain

(2) Possibility of escalation

- Better than even chance Cubans would not acquiesce in search

- Better

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- Better than even chance Soviets would not react strongly, although chances would vary with form of "quarantine" or surveillance

- Effects on general Soviet position

- Effects on Soviet-Cuban relations

(3) Critical dilemma for Castro

- Escalation by him (especially without Soviet support) would threaten his destruction

- Humiliation, if he acquiesced in search, could have domestic and international repercussions adverse to him

(4) UN Action

- Cuban or Soviet initiative in Security Council on issue of enforcement action by regional organization considered manageable.

(5) Possible Inflation of Castro

- David and Goliath sentiment

- Degree of sympathy for Castro would vary with nature of "quarantine" or surveillance arrangement

3. Form

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3. Form of Arms "Quarantine" or Surveillance

a. Cooperation from OAR's

Necessity for maximum involvement of OAR's, with provision by them of units and facilities for U.S. elements

b. Barrier at source of arms

(1) Description

- Screen of naval and air units from Yucatan Channel around southern coast of Cuba, through Windward Channel, to southeastern Bahamas. All Cuban vessels or vessels of flag of co-operating OAS countries to be stopped and searched.

(2) Advantages

- Dramatic over short term - "hard"

- Gives appearance of being airtight

- Provides opportunities for escalation, if desired

(3) Disadvantages

- Since issue of use of force inescapable, politically

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politically desirable majority (two-thirds plus at least Chile, Mexico or Brazil) very difficult to obtain

- Substantial risk of escalation
- Very high cost, over indefinite period, in terms of U.S. investment of forces (preliminary DOD estimate: 18-27 surface vessels; 36-54 reconnaissance aircraft)
- Substantial engagement of U.S. prestige
- Dramatization of Castro
- Increased difficulty in UN
- Limited capability of CAR's to cooperate, with heightened appearance of unilateral U.S. action
- Limited control of air shipments out of Cuba
- Need to make additional force investment to cover arms movements from points in Caribbean outside Cuba
- Possibility of evasion through northern flank
- Because

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- Because of dramatic appearance of this type of barrier, heightened embarrassment if additional arms deliveries occur

c. Barrier at destination

(1) Description

"Point" defense around coastal rim of Caribbean Basin -- Central America, Colombia and Venezuela -- and Hispaniola, with primary concentration on Colombia and Venezuela. Arrangements required to cover British Guiana. Surveillance and action to be triggered by intelligence or unusual behavior of vessels or aircraft. Three basic variants of this arrangement, depending on method of enforcement.

(2) General advantages of this type of barrier in comparison with barrier at source

- Greater acceptability to CAR's
- Greater cooperation and involvement of CAR's, with reduced burden on U.S. and reduced appearance

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appearance of U.S. unilateral action

- Option possible with respect to use of force in international waters

- Less difficulty in UN

- Reduced costs in terms of investment of forces

- Concentration possible on prime areas to be defended

- Protection against arms shipments originating outside Cuba

- Better case if arms shipments seized at or near point of crime

- Dramatization of Castro reduced

- Improved control over air shipments

(3) <u>General disadvantages</u>

- Purely defensive, appears weak and undramatic

- Dependence on intelligence or suspicion (Cuba not covered), with consequent heightened risk of evasion

- Possibility

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- Possibility (in third variant) of ineffective control of Cuban shipments to British Guiana

(4) Basic variants of this type of barrier

(a) Variant I

- Involves search and, if necessary, seizure on high seas of all suspect vessels of flag of cooperating OAS country on which intelligence has been developed, plus all Cuban vessels. Suspicious aircraft (including all Cuban aircraft) would be tracked to territory of receiving country, which would intercept or seize. Suspect vessels or aircraft of any other flag on which intelligence developed would be shadowed to territory of receiving state, which would search and, if necessary, seize.

(b) Variant II

- Involves escort to nearest OAS sea or air port, for search and possible seizure, of all

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of all suspect vessels and aircraft of flag of cooperating OAS country on which intelligence developed, plus all Cuban vessels and aircraft. Suspect vessels or aircraft of any other flag on which intelligence developed would be shadowed to territory of receiving state, which would search and, if necessary, seize.

(c) Variant III

- Involves shadowing of all suspect vessels and aircraft of any flag (with all Cuban vessels and aircraft to be considered suspect) to territory of receiving countries, which would search, seize or intercept. Arrangements required with authorities of non-OAS countries and territories, especially in British Guiana, to cover arriving Cuban vessels and aircraft.

(5) Relative advantages and disadvantages of variants

Since Variants I and II raise issue of use of force,

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of force, politically desirable majority uncertain (but possibly less so than in case of barrier at source); Variant III most politically acceptable form.

- Variant I "hardest"; Variant III "weakest"

- UN issue raised by Variant I, and to somewhat lesser degree by Variant II, but not by Variant III

- By eliminating need for extended escort or surveillance, Variant I requires least investment of forces; Variant II probably requires highest investment

- Variant III requires cooperation of authorities of non-CAS countries and territories with respect to arriving Cuban vessels and aircraft

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d. Intermediate system

(1) Description

Essentially, flexible combination of barrier at destination, with emphasis on Colombia and Venezuela, plus air reconnaissance in water south of Cuba to identify vessels exiting from Cuba. Selective exercise in international waters, of visit-and-search and, if necessary, escort to nearest OAS port of Cuban vessels and of suspect vessels of flag of cooperating OAS country on which intelligence has been developed. Visit-and-search to be carried out in international waters reasonably (25-50 miles) close to continental land mass. Suspicious aircraft (including all Cuban aircraft) would be tracked to territory of receiving country, which would intercept or seize. Suspect vessels or aircraft of any other flag on which intelligence developed would be shadowed to territory of receiving state, which would search and, if necessary, seize.

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(2) Basic

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(2) Basic points of comparison with other systems

- In sense that use of force in international waters is ultimately involved, it is basically as "hard" as Option 3(b) and Variants I and II of Option 3(c), and accordingly stronger than Variant III.

- By same token, politically desirable majority will be very difficult to obtain, but selectivity feature relative to Variants I and II of Option 3(c) and more nearly defensive appearance relative to Option 3(b) may increase acceptability to OAR's. Definitely less acceptable to OAR's than Variant III.

- Force investment probably greater than Option 3(c) but less than Option 3(b)

- Permits harassment as in Option 3(b) and Variants I and II of Option 3(c), but selective application may reduce chances of Cuban escalation.

- Coverage of vessels exiting Cuba less than in Option 3(b) but greater than in 3(c).

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e. Participation of OAR's

Plans which are developed by Defense under any of the options described above should be designed to make maximum use of the military capabilities of other OAS countries. In turn, State should seek to obtain maximum agreement of the other OAS governments to such use.

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II. Diplomatic Break

A. Advantages

1. Rather dramatic evidence of isolation

2. Denial to Castro of subversive facilities offered by missions in Latin America

B. Disadvantages

1. Uncertainty of getting politically desirable majority

2. Loss of possibly useful political channels into Cuba

3. Some (but acceptable) loss of intelligence facilities

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III. Economic Break [redacted]

(OAS already has this authority under Punta del Este Resolution but has not used it).

A. Advantages

1. Some reduction in trade but largely a symbol of isolation

2. Utility as means of pressure on other free-world countries trading with Cuba

B. Disadvantages

1. Uncertainty (somewhat less than in case of diplomatic break) of politically desirable majority

2. Little practical effect

3. Apparent inconsistency with general trend in East-West trade

[redacted]

IV. Attack by Air and Attempts at Overthrow

A. Advantages

1. Shutting off of Cuba's principal access route to free-world and major reduction in its ability to move people and goods in and out of the island.
2. Important reduction in Cuban ability to move subversives.
3. Utility as some pressure on other free-world countries
4. Action corresponds to Cuban offenses.
5. Reasonable possibility of obtaining politically desirable majority.

B. Disadvantages

1. Possible legal difficulties with respect multilateral and bilateral civil aviation agreements.
2. Some (but acceptable) loss of intelligence facilities.
3. Negative effect on Cuban exile morale (closing of escape route)
4. Probable need to provide alternative means of movement for diplomatic corps in Habana

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V. Condemnation

This is a normal action to take once the investigating committee has verified the charges. It was done in the case of Trujillo's attempted assassination of Betancourt in 1960 and led to OAS/OC action on mandatory break in diplomatic relations and partial economic break with the Dominican Republic. Assuming evidence is conclusive in this case, approval should not constitute a major problem.

VI. Levalle Committee Recommendations

A renewed call for alert against Castro-Communist subversion and endorsement of the Levalle Committee recommendations outlining specific measures for combatting this threat should pose no problem as long as the wording does not obligate states to implement the Levalle Committee recommendations.

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VII. Preliminary Conclusions

1. Form of "quarantine" or surveillance

a. On balance, Option 3 (d) -- the intermediate system -- appears best designed to meet the dual objectives of (1) controlling or preventing arms shipments and (2) of taking advantage of the Venezuelan case to undertake harassment of Castro.

b. Defense planning based on Option 3 (d) should make provision for the possibility of moving from selective to maximum control of suspect vessels.

2. Basic decisions required

Since Option 3 (d) is premised on the willingness of the U.S. and the OAR's to use force if necessary against Cuban and OAR vessels which resist visit-and-search, two basic policy questions are raised.

a. Use of force by U.S.

- Are we prepared to use force in the circumstances described in Option 3 (d)?

b. Effort to obtain OAS approval for use of force

- Are we prepared to make the political expenditures necessary to overcome resistance by OAR's to approving the use

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the use of force, even if we can get only bare minimum two-thirds vote without Chile, Brazil or Mexico.

c. Fall-back

- If the answer to either or both of the two policy questions is negative, we have no alternative but to retreat to Variant III of Option 3 (c). In that event, we must obtain additional measures in other fields from the OAS if the net result of the OAS effort is to be positive.

d. Minimum OAS package acceptable to the U.S.

1. With Option 3 (d)

- Authorization for the use of force

- Condemnation of the Castro regime

- Reaffirmation and invigoration of anti-subversive measures

2. With Variant III of Option 3 (c)

- Defensive system with search and seizure within national territory

- Condemnation

- Reaffirmation and invigoration of anti-subversive

subversive measures

- Obligatory break in air and surface communications between OAS countries and Cuba

e. Prospects for getting minimum acceptable package

- At this time, the chances of getting a politically desirable majority for the minimum package including the use of force are no better than even. It should be noted that, if the OAS goes so far as to approve the use of force, it is quite possible that it will approve measures beyond those included in the minimum acceptable package.

- At this time the chances of getting a politically desirable majority for the minimum acceptable package not including the use of force are somewhat better than even.

- Success in either case depends on the persuasiveness of the Venezuelan case and the vigor of Venezuelan and U.S. efforts, particularly with Chile, Mexico, Brazil, Bolivia and Uruguay.

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Message to Ambassador Stewart - CARACAS

1. We understand President Betancourt plans some time next week announce (1) that Paraguan arms cache contains weapons whose markings clearly identify them as coming from Cuba; and (2) that GOV is considering taking matter to OAS.

2. On basis Paraguan cache, "Cisne" incident and [redacted] indicative step-up Cuban intentions and capabilities for clandestine delivery arms to Caribbean area, [redacted]

3. Current thinking is for USG to work out surveillance arrangements with [redacted] countries, preferably on collective basis. [redacted] Expect tentative outline operational plan for surveillance, involving cooperative arrangements with [redacted] other countries, will be sent night Nov. 19.

4. We believe

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4. We believe that Betancourt's announcement on Paraguana cache provides politically ideal platform for GOV to take initiative in suggesting multilateral cooperation in maintaining surveillance against further efforts Castro regime export arms and men to other countries of hemisphere. We has sound inter-American basis for appeal in para. 3 of RES II of 8th MFM (approved by all American Governments except Bolivia) whereby Foreign Ministers resolved "To urge member states to take those steps that they may consider appropriate for their individual or collective self-defense and to cooperate, as may be necessary or desirable, to strengthen their capacity to counteract threats or acts of aggression, subversion, or other dangers to peace and security resulting from the continued intervention in this hemisphere of Sino-Soviet powers...". Armed with this inter-American decision and evidence Paraguana cache, Betancourt would be in very strong position domestically and internationally to take leadership in proposing cooperative surveillance arrangements.

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5. FYI. We are concerned, however, over how he proposes to handle OAS aspect. His options appear to be:

A. In announcement make general statement about going to OAS on matter, and in OAS presentation make specific appeal based on RES II.

B. include in announcement specific appeal to other governments of area for surveillance cooperation on basis RES II, followed by presentation of evidence to OAS with reference to appeal already made.

C. In his announcement say that he is going to OAS on matter to seek condemnation and/or sanctions against Castro regime.

Our attitude toward options is:

Option A - satisfactory way to proceed but seeking appeal in OAS runs risk of affording some members basis for questioning appeal or saying they will not cooperate which would tend to weaken objectives of appeal.

Option B - preferred way to proceed since it accomplishes purpose of taking issue to OAS and by presenting appeal as fait accompli tends to minimize opportunity for other delegations to raise contentious issues.

Option C

Option C - politically unsuitable at this time because we doubt that incident is sufficiently dramatic to overcome resistance of five countries maintaining relations with Castro regime. If option pushed, it likely lead to dissension in debate and divided vote which would break united inter-American stand achieved in 1962 missile crisis.

[redacted] B1/B5

you are authorized to suggest Option B. If you discover he determined follow Option C, you should not raise objection but point out problems we face and stress importance making careful assessment of where we likely come out. Also find out precisely what he has in mind as to timing, basis for action and nature of sanctions. END FYI

6. Request you take up foregoing with Betancourt soonest.

[redacted] B1/B5

you may indicate a proposed operational plan will be forth coming soonest. You should also suggest to Betancourt that he may want to include in his statement a reference to free world shipping in Cuban trade which by helping Castro regime maintain itself also enables it to promote subversion throughout hemisphere.

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I. OAS Action on the Venezuelan Arms Cache

The OAS Investigating Committee in its report will conclude that Cuba is guilty of a series of acts of intervention and aggression against the territorial integrity, the political sovereignty and the stability of the democratic institutions of Venezuela as evidenced by its promotion of subversion in that country, particularly in the sending of arms.

The report confronts the United States with three important issues:

a) the OAS sanctions to be applied against the Cuban Government under the Rio Treaty;

b) the forum in which the action should be taken: a Meeting of Foreign Ministers as the Organ of Consultation (MFM/OC) or the Council of the OAS, acting provisionally as Organ of Consultation (COAS/OC);

c) the problem of obtaining a politically acceptable two-thirds majority for meaningful OAS action.

A. Range of OAS Sanctions

The range of measures which might be taken in this situation are:

1. Surveillance Against Arms Shipments

- Recommendation that the American Governments cooperate in establishing surveillance to prevent the direct or indirect export of arms from Cuba to other American Republics and to take such measures, including the use of armed force, as may be necessary, to accomplish this purpose.

- The surveillance could assume two basic forms:

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a. Barrier at source of arms with a screen of naval and air units on the high seas around Cuba for the purpose of stopping and searching all Cuban vessels or vessels of cooperating OAS countries. Use of force against Cuban ships on the high seas would be inescapable.

b. Barrier at destination with "point" defense around the rim of the Caribbean and Hispaniola. Surveillance and action to be triggered by intelligence or unusual behavior of vessels or aircraft. Action could take three forms, based on method of enforcement:

(1) Variant I - Search and, if necessary, seizure on high seas of all suspect vessels of flag of cooperating OAS country plus all Cuban vessels. Suspicious aircraft (including all Cuban aircraft) would be tracked to territory of receiving country, which would intercept or seize. Suspect vessel or aircraft of another flag would be shadowed to territory of receiving state, which would search and, if necessary, seize.

(2) Variant II - Same as I except that instead of search and seizure on high seas of all suspect vessels of OAS country or Cuban flag such vessels would be escorted to nearest seaport or airport of OAS country for search and possible seizure.

(3) Variant III - Shadowing of all suspect vessels or aircraft of any flag to territory of receiving countries which would intercept, search and seize.

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c. Relative merits of the two alternatives:

The barrier at the source would be dramatic over the short term, would give the appearance of being airtight and would permit escalation if desired, but it has the following major disadvantages:

- use of force would be inescapable and a politically desirable majority (the requisite two-thirds plus at least Chile, Brazil or Mexico) very hard to obtain;

- high cost of maintaining over indefinite period in terms of US investment of forces;

- substantial risk of escalation, if not desired;

- difficulties in UN over the problem of "enforcement action" (i.e., whether requiring approval of Security Council);

- appearance of unilateral U.S. action resulting from limited capability of other American Republics to contribute units.

The barrier at destination would be defensive, by itself would appear weak and undramatic and would be dependent on intelligence with consequent heightened risk of evasion. On the other hand it has these general advantages:

- greater acceptability to the other American Republics and greater cooperation and involvement by them;

- less burden on U.S. forces and reduced appearance of U.S. unilateral action.

- reduced problems in UN;

- better protection against arms shipments originating outside Cuba;

- better case if arms shipments seized at or near point of destination;

- Variant III would be much more acceptable to OARs and create less problems in UN than either I or II because use of force on high seas would not be involved.

2. Rupture of Diplomatic and Consular Relations

- An obligatory decision for all American Republics to break diplomatic and consular ties with Cuba. This would require Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and Uruguay--the only American Republics which continue diplomatic and consular relations with Castro--to break relations.

- A possible alternative is a recommendation to break relations which would not be obligatory.

- Advantages and Disadvantages: A decision would be dramatic evidence of isolation and deny Cuba subversive facilities offered by its missions in LA. On the other hand it is uncertain whether we could get a politically desirable majority; there would be some (but acceptable) loss of intelligence facilities and of possibly useful political channels into Cuba.

- A recommendation might gain greater support, but it would represent weaker action and if not followed by one or more of the American Republics which maintain diplomatic relations with Cuba would be counter productive.

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3. Suspension of Trade

- A binding decision on all American Governments to suspend all trade with Cuba, except in foodstuffs, medicines and medical supplies. (COAS already has this authority under the Punta del Este Resolutions but has not used it). Through appropriate language in preamble, taken in conjunction with operative paragraph, we would establish the necessary peg for subsequently taking such unilateral measures of our own as issuing a proclaimed list.

- Advantages and Disadvantages:

Principal advantage would be its usefulness in pressuring other free-world countries to limit trade with Cuba, and providing peg for unilateral steps as noted above. Would result in some reduction in LA trade and discourage expansion of future trade. Main disadvantage is uncertainty (somewhat less than in case of diplomatic break) of obtaining politically desirable majority.

4. Suspension of Air and Sea Communications

- A decision requiring the American Governments to suspend all air and sea transportation to and from Cuba, except for emergency reasons of a humanitarian nature. The suspension would mean that:

a. ships and aircraft of OAS countries could not go to Cuba;

b. Cuban aircraft and ships would not be permitted in OAS country ports or airfields;

c. ships and aircraft of non-OAS countries would not be allowed to stop at an OAS country port or airfield if proceeding en route to or from Cuba;

- From the U.S. standpoint (c) represents a major policy decision in that ships going to or coming from Cuba would not be allowed to call at U.S. ports to take on cargo of any kind. Present prohibition is limited to government-financed cargo.

- Advantages and Disadvantages:

The advantages are:

- Heightening Cuba's isolation from the hemisphere.

- Important reduction in Cuban ability to move subversives.

- Utility as means of pressure on other free-world countries.

- Action related to Cuban offenses.

- Reasonable possibility of obtaining politically desirable majority.

The disadvantages are:

- Possible difficulties arising from making peace keeping decisions under the Rio Treaty override commitments under the Chicago Aviation Convention.

- Problems with non-hemispheric countries by not allowing their flag vessels to pick up U.S. cargoes of any type if they are going to or from Cuba.

- Some (but acceptable) loss of intelligence facilities.

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- Negative effect on Cuban exile morale (closing of escape route).

- Probable need to provide alternative means of movement for diplomatic corps in Habana.

5. Request for Cooperation by Free-World Countries

- A general call to free-world countries to take measures of their own to help the American Governments in their efforts to isolate Cuba as a means of counteracting Castro-communist subversion. This would serve as a forceful expression of hemispheric opinion and give us leverage with free-world countries trading with Cuba to urge they curtail or eliminate such trade.

- Assuming there is support for the measures contemplated, approval of this request should present no significant problems.

6. Condemnation of Castro Regime

- Condemnation of Cuba for a series of acts of intervention and aggression against Venezuela. This is a normal action once the Investigating Committee has verified the charges. It was done in the case of Trujillo's attempted assassination of Betancourt in 1960 and led to MFM/OC action on mandatory diplomatic break with and partial diplomatic break with the Dominican Republic.

- The evidence being conclusive in this case, approval should pose no difficulties.

7. Endorsement of Lavalle Committee Recommendations

- A renewed call for alert against Castro-communist subversion and endorsement of the

Lavalle Committee recommendations outlining specific measures on control of travel, funds and propaganda for subversive purposes.

- No problem is foreseen as long as the wording does not obligate states to implement the Lavalle Committee recommendations.

B. Forum for OAS Action

Under the Rio Treaty action can be taken either by the COAS/OC or the MFM/OC. The determinants have generally been: (a) the gravity of the situation, and (b) the urgency for OAS action. In situations such as the one under consideration where the charges are serious but immediate action is not imperative, the MFM/OC course would usually be followed.

The considerations for or against using the MFM/OC in this case are as follows:

Arguments for:

1. Past practice and the importance of the sanctions contemplated warrant action at the Foreign Minister level.

2. The Venezuelans expect Foreign Minister action and would like to have consecutive meetings to deal with Cuba and strengthening of representative democracy.

3. The MFM is more dramatic, carries more public impact and its decision in form (although not in substance) carries greater weight.

4. Failure to go to an MFM will be interpreted as a downgrading of the seriousness of the case.

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Arguments against:

1. Key countries such as Mexico, Chile and Bolivia are holding general elections this year and may be more inclined to endorse some or all of the measures envisaged if their Foreign Ministers do not have to take the action in the limelight of an MFM.

2. If there is a precarious two-thirds majority making the outcome on some of the more meaningful measures doubtful, it is preferable to have the showdown and possible resulting split in the hemisphere take place in the less dramatic forum of the COAS/OC. An MFM would magnify discord and division.

3. The lower-key COAS/OC will have more time under less pressure to work out language for measures against Cuba likely to gain the widest area of support, thereby minimizing the appearance of dissension over Cuba in the OAS.

4. If the Foreign Ministers meet, there is likely to be pressure for them to consider also the problem of Panama, which from the U.S. point of view is better handled at the less dramatic level of the COAS/OC.

C. Basic Decisions Required

1. Three principal issues need to be decided:

a. Form of surveillance system

- Barrier at destination, in one of its three variants, or mutations thereof, seems to be more advisable than the barrier at the source.

- Policy decision is required on whether we are prepared to:

(a) use force on the high seas to stop Cuban or OAS country vessels which resist visit-and-search;

(b) expend the political capital necessary to overcome the resistance of other American Governments to approving use of force.

- Variant III would not require authorization for use of force and would be satisfactory provided it is accompanied by measures in other fields to make the OAS package a positive one.

b. Suspension of sea transportation

- Suspension of sea communications with Cuba would have greater impact if the OAS decision were to include closing of OAS country ports to ships of non-OAS countries going to or from Cuba in continuous voyage.

- Policy decision is required on whether we are prepared to deny cargoes of any type to ships calling at U.S. ports en route to or from Cuba.

c. Forum for OAS action

- An MFM/OC would be the normal place to act on the findings of the Investigating Committee and Venezuela expects action at this high level.

- Policy decision required on whether we should handle this case in high or low

key and whether we are prepared to go to an MFM and expend the political capital to come out with a positive package.

D. Maximum and Minimum OAS Package Acceptable to U.S.

1. Maximum Package

- Would consist of all the measures listed in Section A, using Variant I or II of barrier at destination, or variation thereof, as the preferred system of surveillance.

- Depending on the decisions made on the three policy issues, we might recommend that Venezuela advance this package in the opening round of negotiations as its preferred position in order to test reaction.

2. Minimum Package

a. Together with authorization to use force on the high seas under some form of barrier at destination, we might settle for:

(1) suspension of trade with Cuba, except for food and medicine;

(2) condemnation of Castro regime;

(3) reaffirmation and invigoration of anti-subversion measures.

b. Together with provision for surveillance and search and seizure only within territorial waters, we would want:

(1) suspension of trade with Cuba, except for food and medicine;

(2) condemnation of Castro regime;

(3) reaffirmation and invigoration of anti-subversive measures;

(4) obligatory break in air and sea communications between OAS countries and Cuba.

3. Prospects for Support

- Much depends on the vigor with which Venezuela presses for action. Another factor is the impact of the Panama crisis on Panama's vote and in general on the continued cohesiveness of the majority. We will not have a clear picture until Venezuela floats a draft resolution and we begin sounding out governments on specific measures.

- Outlook for approval of the maximum package at this stage is not bright.

- Chances of getting a politically desirable majority for the minimum package including use of force at the moment seem no better than even.

- Prospects of getting a political desirable majority for the minimum acceptable package not including use of force are probably better than even.